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I. INTRODUCTION
THIS PAPER PROVIDES an overview of the Canadian law of
damages for personal injury or wrongful death as at Septem-
ber, 2003. Other than Quebec, which is a civil law jurisdiction,
the provinces and territories of Canada operate under a com-
mon law tradition. The assessment of damages for personal in-
jury and wrongful death is discussed here from a common law
perspective, though the basic principles apply in Quebec as well,
albeit with some exceptions. In Canada, the primary aim of an
award of damages is to restore a plaintiff to his or her pre-acci-
dent condition and thereby compensate the plaintiff for the in-
juries he suffered. It follows that an award of damages that
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places the plaintiff in a better position than he or she would
have been in had the accident not occurred overcompensates
the plaintiff and constitutes a windfall. An award beyond full
compensation punishes the defendant and is inconsistent with
the principle of full compensation fundamental to tort law
damages.'
The difficulty, of course, lies in determining what amount of
money will appropriately compensate the plaintiff for all loss
suffered, be it pecuniary or not. Canadian personal injury dam-
ages law recognizes that not all loss the plaintiff suffers is specifi-
cally measurable pecuniary loss. It contemplates the awarding
of non-pecuniary general damages for intangible injury such as
pain, suffering, and loss of the amenities of life, as well as aggra-
vated damages where the defendant's conduct was particularly
blameworthy. As an adjunct to the fundamental compensatory
basis of personal injury damages awards, Canadian courts can
also make non-compensatory awards in the form of exemplary
or punitive damages in circumstances warranting censure and
punishment of the defendant. 2
Because the plaintiff should be compensated for past and pro-
spective pecuniary loss, the award of damages attempts to re-
store the plaintiff to his or her pre-accident financial position in
respect of both pre-trial events and the future. The plaintiff may
also be compensated for past and prospective non-pecuniary
loss, in which case the award of damages provides the plaintiff
with some measure of consolation for his or her intangible
losses.' Pecuniary damages that have crystallized before the trial
date are called "special damages" and must be specifically
pleaded and proved. Non-pecuniary damages and pecuniary
damages that have not crystallized before the trial date are
known as "general damages." As can be seen, the distinction
between special and general damages is one of form rather than
substance.4
If the plaintiffs injury is fatal, the plaintiff's cause of action
vests in his or her estate and a civil action for damages may be
brought or continued by the estate (a "survival action") to re-
I Ratych v. Bloomer, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 940 (McLachlin J.).
2 A chart illustrating the breakdown of the various categories of damages
forms Appendix I to this paper.
3 KEN COOPER-STEPHENSON, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN CANADA 12 (2d ed.
1996).
4 Id. at 73, 91-94.
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cover the deceased plaintiffs pre-death losses.5 Certain of the
plaintiff's dependants may also have a claim against the
tortfeasor if the plaintiff suffers a fatal injury ("fatal accident
claims"). In the common law jurisdictions of Canada, fatal acci-
dent claims, like survival actions, are governed by legislation that
permits specified dependants to recover damages they suffer fol-
lowing the death of someone upon whom they were depen-
dant.6 Whether the action is brought by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff's estate, a dependant, or some other third party such as
an insurer exercising a right of subrogation, the quantum of
damages will be assessed based on actuarial evidence by either a
trial judge sitting alone or ajury, as the case may be. The judge
or jury will determine an appropriate lump sum, subject to
guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Canada in a
1978 trilogy of cases (the "Trilogy") ,7 and also subject to devel-
oping rules regarding other benefits received by the plaintiff or
on the plaintiffs behalf from third party sources ("collateral
benefits"). Rights of subrogation that will affect the plaintiffs
ultimate recovery should also be taken into account. Alterna-
tively, the parties themselves may agree on compensation that
will be paid to the plaintiff over time (a "structured settle-
ment"). As in all civil cases, a successful plaintiff will, as a gen-
eral rule, be entitled to his or her costs.'
This paper focuses on the assessment of damages for personal
injury or wrongful death by Canadian courts once a right of re-
covery has been established either at common law or under stat-
5 Appendix II to this paper outlines the types of damages typically excluded or
recoverable in a survival action in each of Canada's common law provinces or
territories. Note that while Nunavut does have some stand-alone legislation, sur-
vival actions in Nunavut are governed by the Northwest Territories legislation.
6 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 13. Appendix III to this paper sets out
the range of eligible claimants and the types of damages typically excluded or
recoverable in a fatal accident claim in each of Canada's common law provinces
or territories. Again, while Nunavut does have some stand-alone legislation, fatal
accident claims in Nunavut are governed by the Northwest Territories legislation.
7 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Arnold v. Teno,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 287; Thornton v. Prince George Sch. Dist. No. 57, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
267.
3 In Canada, costs are governed by statute and/or the Rules of Court and the
rules therefore differ from one jurisdiction to another. Generally, however, costs
are within the court's discretion and are usually awarded to the successful plain-
tiff in an amount providing less than complete indemnification. A further analy-
sis of costs is beyond the scope of this paper.
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ute.9 Despite this focus, some preliminary issues merit brief
discussion. A plaintiff's right to recovery can be severely limited
by the principles governing causation. For example, the issue of
causation may be unnecessarily conflated with the assessment of
damages issue, giving rise to confusion. Accordingly, prior to
embarking on the more detailed discussion of damages assess-
ment issues in Canada, some problems unique to the causation
issue are addressed here first, followed by an explanation of the
effect of the federal statute, the Carriage by Air Act, 1° and by a




A plaintiff cannot recover damages for his or her injury unless
the injury is causally connected to the accident. The accident
must be the cause of the injury in fact, but must also be the legal
cause of the injury. Legal causation requires that the type or
class of injury be a foreseeable result of the accident, although
the extent of the injury need not be foreseeable. The plaintiff
must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the injury
would not have occurred "but for" the accident, or alternatively,
that the accident materially contributed to the injury.11
If the plaintiff meets either of the "but for" or "material con-
tribution" tests, it is irrelevant that the accident may not have
been the sole cause of the injury. It follows that a plaintiff is not
precluded from recovering where the extent of the injury is un-
usually severe because the plaintiff has some pre-existing injury
or condition that is triggered or exacerbated by the accident.' 2
The "but for" or "material contribution" tests also apply if the
injury is psychological or emotional in nature. Recovery for this
9 The main secondary sources consulted in drafting this paper were: COOPER-
STEPHENSON, supra note 3; 4 REMEDIES IN TORT (Linda D. Rainaldi, ed., 1987);
JAMIE CASSELS, REMEDIES: THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2000). To a lesser extent, the
authors also relied on: CHRISTOPER J. BRUCE, ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES (3d ed. 1999); S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1991); PHILIP H.
OSBORNE, THE LAw OF TORTS (2000); J.G. CASTEL & J. WALKER, CANADIAN CON-
FLICT OF LAws (5th ed. 2002); P. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE & NORTH'S
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1999). In subsequent footnotes, these
sources will be referred to by the author's name unless expressly defined.
10 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26 (R.S.C., ch. C-26 (1985) (Can.)).
11 Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 466.
12 That is, the injury is caused by both tortious and non-tortious factors.
2004] 237
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
kind of harm is also discussed below because psychiatric illness
presents its own unique problems with causation.
Where the plaintiff's injuries or loss are legally caused by
more than one person, the plaintiffs damages will be appor-
tioned among the defendant wrongdoers. In the absence of
contributory negligence, the defendants' liability to the plaintiff
will be joint and several. 13 If the plaintiff is contributorily negli-
gent, there will be apportionment of liability based on respective
degrees of responsibility for causation not only amongst defend-
ants, but also in respect of the plaintiff. In British Columbia, if
the plaintiff is found contributorily negligent, and so is one of
the persons "at fault" for his or her injuries, then in negligence
cases, all defendants' liability to the plaintiff will be several only,
and not joint and several. 4 This is not the case in Alberta,
where a plaintiffs contributory negligence does not alter the
joint and several liability of defendants. 5 Similarly, the Ontario
Negligence Act16 has been interpreted to mean that a plaintiffs
contributory negligence does not affect the joint and several lia-
bility to the plaintiff of multiple defendants.' 7 In cases involving
intentional torts, it has been held that the defendant cannot
raise a contributory negligence defence.'"
13 The British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General is currently engaged
in a comprehensive review of civil liability issues. The government's discussion
paper contemplates reform of a number of areas, including joint and several
liability. The proposed reforms are controversial and, to date, have not received
general support from the British Columbia Bar. Further information may be
found at http://www.ag.bc.ca/liability-review/.
14 Leischner v. West Kootenay Power & Light Co. (1986), 70 B.C.L.R. 145, 173-
174. (C.A.). In British Columbia, the courts can apportion fault to a non-party
where the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. See Wells v. McBrine (1988), 33
B.C.L.R.2d 86 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, (1989), 36 B.C.L.R.2d xxxvii (S.C.C.).
However, they cannot apportion fault to a non-party where there is no contribu-
tory negligence. See Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Touche Ross, (1989), 36
B.C.L.R.2d 381 (C.A.). Also, in British Columbia, a contributory negligence de-
fence, and resulting severing of defendants' liability if successful, can be used in
breach of contract cases. See Crown W.est Steel Fabricators v. Capri Ins. Servs.
Ltd., (2002), B.C.L.R.4th 272 (C.A. 417).
15 Campbell Estate v. Calgary Power, [1989] 1 W.W.R. 36 (Alta. C.A.).
16 R.S.O. 1990, c. N-1 (R.S.O., ch. N-i (1990) (Ont.)).
17 Ingles v. Tutkaluk Constr. Ltd., (1995), 18 C.L.R.2d 67 (Ont. Gen. Div.); see
also D. CHEIFETZ, APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT IN TORT 20 (1981).
18 Boma Mfg. v. C.I.B.C., [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727 (applying to the tort of conver-
sion); Bains v. Hofs (1992), 76 B.C.L.R.2d 98 (S.C.) (applying to assault and tres-
pass). The interface of causation theory, apportionment of liability, and the
defense of contributory negligence is a complex one. This paper will not further
discuss recovery in the context of multiple tortious causes of injury or loss.
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B. THE "THIN" OR "CRUMBLING" SKULL PLAINTIFF
Plaintiffs with a "thin skull" are those who are more suscepti-
ble to injury than the average person. Thus, the extent of the
injury suffered is unexpectedly severe because of some pre-ex-
isting psychological or physical condition. In proving causation,
the "thin skull" plaintiff must establish that the accident acti-
vated this pre-existing condition that would not have otherwise
materialized or been harmful. If causation is proved on a bal-
ance of probabilities, the defendant will be liable for the full
extent of the harm even though the effects of the injury are
more extensive, persistent, or devastating than they might have
been with a more robust plaintiff. The tortfeasor must take his
victim as he finds him.
Plaintiffs with a "crumbling skull" suffer from a pre-existing
degenerative condition and, to prove causation, they must estab-
lish, on a balance of probabilities, that the accident aggravated
the condition. Provided the "crumbling skull" plaintiff meets
the onus of proof, the defendant will be liable for any additional
damage the accident has caused. If there is a measurable risk
that the pre-existing condition would have worsened to some
extent apart from the accident, the award of damages will be
reduced according to the relative likelihood of this happening.
The defendant does not have to prove the risk on a balance of
probabilities. Both the "thin skull" and "crumbling skull" rules
are consistent with the general principle that damages for per-
sonal injury are designed to restore the plaintiff to his or her
pre-accident condition, but it is important to keep the assess-
ment of damages issue separate from the issue of causation."9
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL VERSUS PHYSICAL HARM
Psychological or emotional harm-as distinct from the "ordi-
nary" pain and suffering that might flow from a physical in-
jury-is now compensable in Canada, even without proof of
physical injury provided the harm constitutes a recognizable psy-
chiatric injury and the psychiatric injury was a reasonably fore-
seeable consequence of the defendant's conduct.2" That said,
psychiatric illness presents unique problems of proof and causa-
tion. In particular, the plaintiff must meet the "but for" or "ma-
19 Hosak v. Hirst (2003), 9 B.C.L.R.4th 203, 10 (C.A.).
20 A.M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 390-91 (7th ed. 2001). See the leading
case ofVanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1999), 180 D.L.R.4th 748
(Ont. C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 50 (QL).
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terial contribution" test,21 must establish that his or her
psychiatric injury is something suffered apart from grief and sor-
row, which are not compensable, and must show that the psychi-
atric illness is beyond the plaintiffs control. 22 The law has
developed to permit both primary victims (those directly af-
fected by the defendant's conduct) and secondary victims (those
indirectly affected, such as witnesses to accidents) to recover
damages for psychiatric illness, formerly known as "nervous
shock."
Matkin v. Gauarian provides a recent example of an award of
damages to a primary victim for a psychiatric injury.23 As the
plaintiff rounded the corner on a mountainous, winding stretch
of highway, her vehicle was struck at high speed by a trailer
truck traveling in the wrong lane. The impact threw the plain-
tiff onto the passenger side of her vehicle and she suffered rela-
tively minor physical injuries that resolved in six months.24 After
the accident, the plaintiff suffered from an anxiety or phobia
that significantly affected her ability to drive.25 The plaintiff was
awarded $40,000 in non-pecuniary damages for her psychologi-
cal injury.26
With respect to secondary victims, however, there is still some
debate in Canadian law as to whether or not "control mecha-
nisms '27 are required in addition to the reasonable foreseeabil-
ity test. In the United Kingdom, the plaintiff must meet a
proximity test that involves consideration of factors such as the
closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and the vic-
tim, the plaintiffs proximity to the scene of the incident, and
the time lapse between the incident and the onset of the psychi-
atric illness. 28 The British Columbia Court of Appeal has also
21 C.R. v. R.R., 2002 BCSC 1275, 2002 BC.C. LEXIS 4533.
22 See, e.g., Yoshikawa v. Yu (1996), 21 B.C.L.R.3d 318, 24 (C.A.) (allowing the
plaintiff to recover damages for a somatoform disorder once the court ruled out
any "conscious failure to exercise [her] willpower to bring about a healing of the
symptoms").




27 Control mechanisms were explained in Devji v. Burnaby (District) (1999),
180 D.L.R.4th 205. (B.C.C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed, [1999]
S.C.C.A. No. 608 (QL). British Columbia Chief Justice McEachern (as he then
was), stated that control mechanisms were "limitations on the extent of the duty
of care that arises from foreseeable consequences." Id. 27.
28 McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1982] 2 All E.R. 298 (H.L.). This proximity test
was modified slightly in Alcock v. Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police,
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concluded that public policy may require the imposition of con-
trol mechanisms in nervous shock cases.29 In Devji v. Burnaby,
Chief Justice McEachern (as he then was) held that in addition
to reasonable foreseeability, the court must consider proximity
(as described above) and the nature of the experience itself. To
recover damages for psychiatric illness, the secondary victim
must suffer a "fright, terror or horror."3
It seems that the Ontario courts have avoided the phrase
"control mechanism," but similar factors appear to be consid-
ered under the rubric of "reasonable foreseeability," arguably
eliminating any significant differences between the two .jurisdic-
tions. In determining whether the plaintiff parents' alleged psy-
chiatric illnesses were reasonably foreseeable in Vanek v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal
took into account the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.3' At paragraph 34, Justice MacPherson stated that "fore-
seeability cannot be considered in the abstract" and that "the
surrounding circumstances will include the identity of the par-
ties, their relationship to each other, the careless conduct, its
aftermath or consequences, and the injuries suffered. 32
D. CARRIAGE BY AIR ACT
The Carriage by Air Act33 incorporates the Montreal Conven-
tion of 1999, which came into force in Canada on November 4,
2003.34 The Montreal Convention replaces the 1929 Warsaw
[1991] 4 All E.R. 907 (H.L.) and in White v. Chief Constable of the South York-
shire, [1999] 1 All E.R. 1. (H.L.).
29 Rhodes Estate v. CNR (1990), 75 D.L.R.4th 248 (B.C.C.A.), application for
leave to appeal dismissed (1991), 79 D.L.R.4th vii (S.C.C.); see also Devji v. Burnaby
(District) (1999), 180 D.L.R.4th 205 (B.C.C.A.), application for leave to appeal dis-
missed, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 608 (QL).
30 Devji v. Burnaby (District) (1999), 180 D.L.R.4th 205, 228-29, 75-76
(C.A.).
31 Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada (1999), 180 D.L.R.4th 748
(Ont. C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 50 (QL).
The Court of Appeal considered that the injured person was the plaintiffs'
daughter, the potential seriousness of the injury, the actual extent of the harm
(minimal), the plaintiffs' physical proximity to the incident, and how the inci-
dent was handled by the professionals and others involved. The plaintiffs' claim
for damages for their psychological injury was denied on appeal. Id.
32 Id.
33 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26 (R.S.C., ch. C-26 (1985) (Can.)).
34 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9740 [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
2004]
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Convention, 35 as amended by the Hague Protocol of 195536 and
the Montreal Additional Protocols,37 which continue to apply in
states that have not ratified the Montreal Convention. The pro-
visions of the Montreal Convention deal with the liability of a
carrier to its passengers and are intended to constitute a uni-
form international code, excluding any resort to the rules of do-
mestic law. Therefore, if a plaintiff is injured or dies as a result
of an accident on an international flight originating in Canada
and having its final destination in Canada or in another country
that has ratified the Montreal Convention, the right to recover
damages in respect of an injury or death is governed by Sched-
ule VI to the Carriage by Air Act, and the fatal accident or sur-
vival action legislation referred to elsewhere in this paper would
not apply.
Accordingly, a claim for damages, brought by a passenger aris-
ing from his presence on board an aircraft making an interna-
tional flight," or embarking or disembarking such an aircraft, is
subject to the provisions of the Montreal Convention, whether
the cause of action is framed in negligence or in contract. 9 An
.5 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 2000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2004) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
36 Protocol to Amend the Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, opened
for signature September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol].
37 Protocols Nos. 1-4 to Amend the Convention for Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October
1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955,
opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9145, 9146, 9417, 9470 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocols].
38 "International carriage" is defined in Article 1, Schedule VI of the Carriage
by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26(R.S.C., ch. C-26 (1985) (Can.)) as:
[A]ny carriage in which, according to the agreement between the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment,
are situated either within the territories of two States Parties, or
within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stop-
ping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is
not a State Party. Carriage between two points within the territory
of a single State Party without an agreed stopping place within the
territory of another State is not international carriage for the pur-
poses of this Convention.
Id.
3q See Clarke v. Royal Aviation Group Inc. (1997), 34 O.R.3d 481 (Gen. Div.);
see also Gal v. Northern Mountain Helicopters, Inc. (1999), 177 D.L.R.4th 249
(B.C.C.A.).
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"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 has been defined by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Air France v. Saks,4 ° a
definition that was adopted in Ontario in Quinn v. Canadian In-
ternational Airlines Ltd. and recently affirmed in MacDonald v. Ko-
rean Air.41 Under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, the
carrier's liability is limited to damages for bodily injury suffered
by a passenger.4 2 The carrier is not liable for damages for em-
barrassment and emotional distress or additional expenses in
the absence of bodily injury,43 nor is the carrier liable for puni-
tive damages if the plaintiff dies, is wounded, or suffers any
other bodily injury.44
Further, the carrier is strictly liable for the first 100,000 special
drawing rights ("SDRs") 45 of damage except to the extent that
the carrier can prove that the damage was caused or contributed
to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the
person claiming compensation. The strict liability imposed on
carriers under the Montreal Convention constitutes a significant
departure from the 1929 Warsaw Convention, which did not im-
pose strict liability on carriers but instead capped their liability.
40 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405-06 (1985). Justice O'Connor, speaking
for the Court, stated:
We conclude that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger....
Any injury is the product of a chain of causes, and we require only
that the passenger be able to prove that some link in the chain was
an unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger.
Id.
Recovery of damages is still dependent upon there being an "accident." Presum-
ably, therefore, the case law interpreting "accident" prior to the coming into
force of the Montreal Convention continues to apply.
41 See Quinn v. Canadian Int'l Airlines Ltd. (1994), 18 O.R.3d 326 (Gen. Div.),
affd, [1997] O.J. No. 1832 (C.A.) (QL), leave to appeal refused (1997), 108 O.A.C.
318 (S.C.C.); see also MacDonald v. Korean Air, [2002] O.J. No. 3655 (S.C.J.)
(QL), affd (2003), 171 O.A.C. 368, application for leave to appeal refused, [2003]
S.C.C.A. No. 160 (QL).
42 Montreal Convention, supra note 34, art. 17.
43 See Mileikovskaia v. Royal Airlines, Inc., [1998] O.J. No. 5352 (Gen. Div.)
(QL); see also Chau v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 02-CV-24145 2SR, 2003 WL
22417503 (Ont. S.C.J. Sept. 3, 2003) (NordheimerJ.).
- Naval-Torres v. NorthwestAirlines (1998), 159 D.L.R.4th 67 (Ont. Gen.
Div.).
45 Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26, s. 2(7)(b) (R.S.C., ch. C-26,
§ 2(7) (b) (1985) (Can.)) (providing that SDRs will be converted into Canadian
dollars at the rate established by the International Monetary Fund. For example,
in September 2003, 100,000 SDR's were worth approximately $190,000 CAD and
$140,000 USD).
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For damages in excess of 100,000 SDRs, the carrier can limit or
exclude its liability if it proves that the damage was not due to
the negligence or wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its
servants or agents, or that such damage was due solely to the
negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party.
However, in the absence of such proof, there is no monetary
limit on the amount of recoverable compensatory damages.
An action for damages may be brought by certain of the plain-
tiffs dependants or the plaintiffs estate.4 6 Section 1 of Sched-
ule II expressly provides that claims for damages are only
enforceable for the benefit of "members of the passenger's fam-
ily." That term is defined to mean spouses (married, or com-
mon law for a period of at least one year), parents, step-parents,
grandparents, siblings, children (including adopted children,
step-children, or others for whom the passenger stood in loco
parentis), and grandchildren.47 It seems that if the action for
damages is brought by the estate, then unlike survival actions,
the damages recovered must be for the benefit of those individ-
uals who come within the definition of "members of the passen-
ger's family" and not for the estate generally.
An action for damages must be brought within two years.4"
The action for damages need not be brought in a federal court.
Rather, the plaintiff has the option of bringing the action in the
jurisdiction of one of the contracting territories, "either before
the court of the domicile of the carrier or of its principal place
of business, or where it has a place of business through which
the contract has been made or before the court at the place of
destination."49 Notably, the Montreal Convention adds a fifth
possible jurisdiction (known as the "Fifth Jurisdiction"). Pursu-
46 Id. § 2, Schedule II.
47 Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12 (S.C., ch. 12
(2000) (Can.)) (extending benefits and obligations under various federal statutes
to all couples who have been in conjugal relationships for at least one year, rather
than just to opposite-sex couples, and applying to federally administered benefits
programs and to rights of recovery under various federal statutes). Section 73
amends the Carriage by Air Act to broaden the definition of persons entitled to
recover in the event of the death of a passenger to include a same-sex spouse.
48 Article 35, Schedule VI to the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26
(R.S.C., ch. C-26 (1985) (Can.)). Note that the case law does not appear to ad-
dress the availability of a jury trial. The implication is that jury trials are not
precluded by the Montreal Convention.
49 Article 33, Schedule VI to the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26
(R.S.C., ch. C-26 (1985) (Can.)).
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ant to Article 33 of Schedule VI, an action for damages may also
be brought
[I] n the territory of a State Party in which at the time of the acci-
dent the passenger has his or her principal and permanent resi-
dence and to or from which the carrier operates services for the
carriage of passengers by air, either on its own aircraft, or on
another carrier's aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement,
and in which that carrier conducts its business of carriage of pas-
sengers by air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself
or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement.
It is generally accepted that code share agreements and simi-
lar inter-carrier marketing agreements fall within the scope of
"commercial agreement."
E. CHOICE OF Law PRINCIPLES FOR PERSONAL
INJURY DAMAGES ASSESSMENT
Personal injury claims arising out of aviation accidents may
well involve multiple jurisdictions in that the parties may reside
or be present for business purposes in various places, and the
action may be brought in a different jurisdiction than that
where the accident occurred. Consequently, a brief mention of
choice of law principles in the personal injury damages context
is appropriate.
Conceptually a distinction is drawn between substantive and
procedural matters in litigation where there is a choice of law
issue: substantive matters are determined by the lex causae and
procedural matters by the lex fori.50 Therefore, in cases where
the law of the forum is not that of the place where the cause of
action arose, it becomes necessary to determine whether the
matter of damages is substantive or procedural. The conflict of
laws commentators acknowledge that the determination of
whether a matter is substantive or procedural is not an easy or
self-evident one, and cannot be done in the abstract. It has
been said the reason the distinction is made in private interna-
tional law is for the convenience of the court. With respect to
certain matters, even if the cause of action arises under foreign
law, the forum court must be able to apply its own rules for the
mechanics of justice to work effectively.51
50 CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 9, ch. 6: Substance and Procedure; NORTH &
FAwCETT, supra note 9, ch. 6: Substance and procedure.
51 See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 9, at 70-72; see also Tolofson v. Jensen;
Lucas v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 1071-72.
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In Canada, tort liability is a substantive matter, and, as a rule,
is to be determined by the law of the place of the tort (the lex loci
delicti) .52 "Liability" includes questions of causation and remote-
ness. 53 Remoteness includes whether the plaintiff can recover
only reasonably foreseeable losses, 4 and what heads of damage
are recoverable (e.g., pain and suffering, past income loss, cost
of future care, etc.). 5 The measure of damages (i.e., the quanti-
fication or assessment of the amount of money to which a plain-
tiff is entitled under each head of damage, 6 and the manner in
which provision is made for future or prospective losses5 7 ), how-
ever, is procedural, and is determined by the law of the forum
(the lex fori). 8
A statutory bar against the actionability of certain causes of
action or against recovery in an action for certain types of dam-
ages is equivalent to a common law rule that completely pre-
cludes recovery for certain heads of damages. Therefore,
applying the Canadian choice of law rules, the lex loci delicti
should be looked to in assessing whether there is any statutory
regime precluding recovery for certain types of injuries, or
heads of damages, since that has been determined to constitute
52 Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 1052-55, where Justice La Forest,
for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that in certain
exceptional circumstances, involving international litigation, the choice of law
rule should not be applied where its application would be unjust. The minority
did not take exception to the availability of an exception but would have made it
somewhat more broadly available.
53 NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 9, at 86-87 (citing, inter alia, Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l. Rly. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904)).
54 CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 9, 6.3.f, n.39 (citing J. D'Almeida Aranjo
Lda. v. Sir Frederick Becker & Co. Ltd., [1953] Q.B. 329); Livesley v. E. Clements
Horst Co., [1925] 1 D.L.R. 159 (S.C.C.)).
55 CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 9, 6.3.f, n.40 (citing Chaplin v. Boys, [1971]
A.C. 356, 379, 392, 395; contra at 382; Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, 20, 41
(C.A.); contra at 32; Naftalin v. London Midland & Scottish Ry. Co., [1933] S.C.
259; McElroy v. M'Allister, [1949] S.C. 110 (Sct.); Mackinnon v. Iberia Shipping
Co., [1954] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 372); see id. 35.7, n.6 (stating specifically, by way of
contrast, that "[t] he nature of the remedy to be granted is a matter for the lexfori
and a quantification of damages falls within this principle.") (internal citation
omitted); see also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 9, at 87.
56 CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 9, 6.3f, n.41 (citing Kohnke v. Karger,
[1951] 2 K.B. 670; Chaplin v. Boys, [1971] A.C. 356, 379, 381, 382, 392-394; Story
v. Stratford Mill Bldg. Co. (1913), 18 D.L.R. 309 (Ont. C.A.); Young v. Industrial
Chemicals Co. Ltd., [1939] 4 D.L.R. 392 (B.C.S.C.)).
57 CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 9, 6.3f , n.42 (citing Kohnke v. Karger,
[1951] 2 K.B. 670; Chaplin v. Boys, [1971] A.C. 356, 393-94.
58 CASTEL & WALKER, supra note 9, 6.3f, 35.7, n.8; see also NORTH & FAWCETr,
supra note 9, at 87-88.
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a substantive matter. For example, if an accident occurs in Cali-
fornia and that jurisdiction precludes tort actions for personal
injury where the plaintiff is injured while working (workers'
compensation legislation), the law of California should deter-
mine whether the claim can be maintained, even if the law of
the forum does not include workers' compensation type legisla-
tion. If the place of the tort was British Columbia, and so British
Columbia law would be applied on substantive matters, then
damages for loss of consortium would not be recoverable be-
cause the Family Relations Act prohibits recovery in any action
for that head of damage. 9 Similarly, because it is the lex loci
delicti that is determinative of the heads of damage for which
recovery can be had, the no-fault legislation, if any, applicable in
the forum jurisdiction will not be taken into account in assessing
the maintainability of a claim arising out of an accident occur-
ring outside the forum, even if that legislation is structured to
preclude tort recovery for certain types of damages.6" But these
determinations are different from assessment of the measure of
damages under a specified head of damages that is recoverable
in respect of the cause of action. Once it is established (as a
matter of substantive law) that recovery for that head is availa-
ble, the law of the jurisdiction in which the claim is being
59 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, s. 123 (R.S.B.C., ch. 128, § 123 (1996) (B.C.)).
60 See, e.g., George v. Gubernowicz (1999), 44 O.R.3d 247 (Gen. Div.), where
an accident occurred in Alberta. Under Alberta law, a claim for economic loss
was maintainable, although it was not under Ontario law because of no-fault legis-
lation that barred tort actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents. The court
stated that the plaintiff, who was an Ontario resident, was entitled to maintain the
claim for economic loss in the Ontario action because Alberta law applied. Id. at
250-51. The court further noted:
The defendant on this motion asserts that the plaintiff who has re-
ceived benefits pursuant to the no-fault insurance scheme in Onta-
rio has in essence elected to receive benefits provided by Ontario
insurance law and an injustice would occur if the plaintiff were to
ultimately be entitled to receive benefits from another system in
addition to the no-fault benefits being paid in Ontario. There was
no evidence before me to support the proposition by the defendant that the
plaintiff will be unjustly benefited by being permitted to have access both to
the no-fault regime in Ontario because he has his own insurance policy as
well as a cause of action pursuant to law. The defendant has also pro-
vided no authority for its assertion that the plaintiff has in any way
attorned to Ontario law by electing to receive the no-fault benefits
payable under the Ontario no-fault insurance scheme.
Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
Query what the ruling would have been had evidence been presented showing
the plaintiff would receive double recovery if the Ontario benefits were not taken
into account?
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brought (the lex fori) applies to assess the quantum of
damages.6'
III. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
As mentioned above, the goal of an award of personal injury
damages is to compensate a plaintiff for his or her loss insofar as
it is possible to do this with money. Compensatory damages are
awarded for past and future loss, and on a special and general
basis. The award is made as a one-time, all-inclusive lump sum.
The assessment of general damages for the future loss compo-
nent of that award is arrived at using the actuarial method and
therefore requires the court to make or approve mathematical
calculations, rely on the advice of actuaries and economists, and
accept statistical averages.62 The plaintiff is not required to
prove his or her future losses (damages) on a balance of
probabilities; rather, damages are assessed according to the de-
gree of likelihood that an event will or will not happen.6" Never-
theless, a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his or her past and
future loss.
In accordance with the compensatory principle, courts strive
to provide a plaintiff with full compensation for his or her pecu-
niary loss (both past and future), and fair compensation for
non-pecuniary loss.64 Thus, damages should be assessed in their
real context and should serve some useful function.65 Awards of
compensatory damages are often discounted or grossed up to
reflect the fact that damages (or at least general damages) are
largely a product of estimation, and are awarded in present dol-
lars for both past and present losses. For the same reason, the
61 One of the more complex questions that may arise is what law should be
applied in assessing the effect of collateral benefits. The issue may be further
complicated where the collateral benefits are paid pursuant to a statutory scheme
that is wholly or partially prohibits tort actions. Arguably, collateral benefits gen-
erally, and particularly government benefits or subsidies paid for medical or long-
term care, should not constitute a "head of damage" because by definition, they
offset rather than increase the loss suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, it seems cor-
rect to say that the issue of deductibility of collateral benefits forms part of the
principled assessment or quantifying of the amount of damages for certain types
of losses that the injured person is entitled to recover and thus should be gov-
erned by the law of the forum. Further analysis of this issue is beyond the scope
of this paper.
62 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 58.
63 Id. at 67.
64 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. (1974), 54 D.L.R.3d 85 (Alta. T.D.),
varied (1975), 64 D.L.R.3d 663 (Alta. C.A.), rev'd in part, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229.
65 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 114-15.
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awards may attract interest. In particular, the pre-trial loss com-
ponent of an award of damages should attract interest to com-
pensate the plaintiff for that interest he or she could have
earned but for the injury. Arguably, the plaintiff should not
have interest on the post-trial component of the damages award
because he or she has not yet incurred the expenses. The plain-
tiff's entitlement to interest is governed by statute and therefore,
those rights and rates of interest differ from one Canadian juris-
diction to the next.66 To avoid overcompensating the plaintiff,
it has been suggested that a plaintiff's pecuniary loss should be
assessed before his or her non-pecuniary loss. Aggravated dam-
ages may then be assessed as part of the general compensatory
damages component of the award if the non-pecuniary award
requires augmentation. Finally, punitive damages may also be
assessed in the appropriate circumstances. 67 Each of these cate-
gories of damages will be discussed in more detail below.
A. PECUNIARY Loss
A plaintiff's6" pecuniary or financial loss can be further subdi-
vided into the following categories: special damages; future loss
of working capacity (which includes traditional claims for loss of
earnings, loss of homemaking capacity, and possible loss of
shared family income) ;69 and future cost of care. These individ-
ual categories of loss are described below, but all pecuniary
damages are assessed in accordance with some general princi-
ples. For example, an award of pecuniary damages may be re-
duced if the defendant proves that making the award without
deduction will result in over-compensation of the plaintiff be-
cause the plaintiff will also recover in respect of certain losses
from a third party source (the "collateral benefits" issue). Alter-
66 All Canadian common law jurisdictions have enacted legislation governing
the award of pre- and/or post-judgment interest. See, e.g.,Judgment Interest Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c.J-1, s. 2(2) (R.S.A., ch.J-1, § 2(2) (2000) (Alta.)) (prohibiting an
award of interest on, inter alia, post-trial pecuniary loss and exemplary damages).
67 Huff v. Price (1990), 51 B.C.L.R.2d 282, 300 (C.A.). This is not a personal
injury case, but has been applied in the personal injury context.
68 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 189. The author states that third par-
ties may also recover pecuniary loss arising out of the personal injury to another
in limited circumstances: spouses, parents, and employers may have a claim at
common law. Certain relatives may have a claim under Ontario's Family Law Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (R.S.O., ch. F.3 (1990) (Ont.)); and husbands and wives may
have a claim in Alberta under the Domestic Relations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. D-14
(R.S.A., ch. D-14 (2000) (Alta.)).
69 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 90.
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natively, or additionally, the pecuniary award may be scaled up
or down by various percentages to reflect life events that impact
on prospective losses ("contingencies").7 These contingencies
may be ones that are commonly experienced such as illness
(general contingencies) or contingencies peculiar to the plain-
tiff that therefore require proof (specific contingencies). Al-
though contingencies may be positive as well as negative, in
practice, awards are reduced according to the degree of likeli-
hood of the happening of an event more often than they are
increased.
Once the award for pecuniary loss is adjusted for contingen-
cies, pecuniary damages for future losses will be discounted7 on
the assumption that the plaintiff will invest the lump-sum award
at a rate higher than the inflation rate, thereby earning a profit.
Pecuniary damages for pre-trial losses ("special damages") at-
tract prejudgment interest to compensate for the lost opportu-
nity to invest those funds and earn profit.12 The pecuniary
award for cost of future care is subject to a gross-up for tax con-
sequences. That is, the courts recognize that the plaintiff will be
taxed on the award for cost of future care and make an upwards
adjustment to the award to compensate.7 3 Finally, if the plaintiff
can establish that he or she requires professional assistance in
managing an award of damages for future pecuniary loss, the
plaintiff may be entitled to management fees to cover the cost of
these services."
1. Special Damages
Special damages compensate plaintiffs for all pre-trial mone-
tary losses.7 5 Special damages are generally less controversial in-
sofar as they can be supported by evidence. Having said that,
the plaintiff is required to plead and prove special damages to
recover them. Not all special damages can be strictly proven,
70 Id. at 375-394, 449-455.
71 Id. at 400 (noting that the discount rate may be legislated depending on the
jurisdiction, though evidence may be adduced to show that the legislated dis-
count rate is inappropriate in the circumstances).
72 Id. at 83.
73 Id. at 457.
74 Id. at 119-124.
75 The term "special damages" has been succinctly defined in Canada as "pre-
cisely calculable expenses or losses incurred prior to the date of decision . .. ."
Butterill v. Via Rail Canada, Inc. (1980), 1 C.H.R.R. D/233, D/234 (Human
Rights Rev. Trib.). With respect to the recovery of court order interest, the char-
acterization of damages as "special" as opposed to "general" can be significant.
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however, as loss of earning capacity can involve some degree of
estimation. In assessing special damages, contingencies are
properly taken into consideration, but given that the estimate of
pre-trial loss of working capacity is based on "strong evidential
indicators," they are less likely to play a significant role.76
a. Pre-trial Loss of Working Capacity
Under this head of damages, a plaintiff can recover for gross
earnings lost between the injury and the date of trial. Salary loss
generally makes up the largest part of the damages awarded
under this head, but the plaintiff can also recover lost benefits,
gratuities, profits, or other financial gains where those losses can
be established on a balance of probabilities.7 7 Other losses com-
pensable under this head of damages include loss of homemak-
ing capacity calculated at replacement cost,7" and loss of shared
family income, which aims to compensate a plaintiff for the lost
financial benefits that flow from an interdependent relation-
ship. 79 Damages for lost earnings will take into account any in-
come the plaintiff is able to earn during the pre-trial period; but
if the plaintiff is totally disabled, no deduction will be made
from the post-injury, pre-trial income.80 Where the plaintiff re-
ceives wage replacement indemnity benefits from a collateral
source but still claims damages for pre-trial loss of working ca-
pacity, it must be determined whether, to avoid over-compensa-
tion, deduction should be made for such benefits. If such
benefits are paid pursuant to private insurance or employment-
based benefits plans, then they will not usually be taken into
account, so no deduction will be made.8'
76 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 161-163.
77 Proof of pre-trial loss of working capacity is frequently based on information
contained in income tax returns or assessments. However, the failure to file an
income tax return or to pay income tax (e.g., on unreported income such as tips)
does not preclude the plaintiff from proving his or her loss.
78 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 147. If a replacement expense has not
been incurred, the loss of homemaking capacity is best treated as a non-pecuni-
ary loss. Id.
79 Id. at 145. The loss of an opportunity to form a permanent interdependent
relationship is generally compensated by non-pecuniary damages.
80 Rainaldi, supra note 9, at ch. 27, §84.
81 One of the leading Canadian cases on this issue is Cunningham v. Wheeler,
[1994] S.C.R. 359, sub nom. Cooper v. Miller. For further discussion of the issue
of deduction for collateral benefits, see infra pp. 258-266.
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b. Pre-trial Cost of Care
This head of damages includes all reasonable pre-trial ex-
penses the plaintiff (or a third party on the plaintiffs behalf)
would not have incurred but for the injury, and can therefore
include hospitalization and medical expenses, as well as home
and living expenses. Potential rights of subrogation (against the
plaintiff and/or the defendants) available to providers of these
types of services must be taken into account when assessing this
head of damage. The court will allow recovery for any expense
that the plaintiff honestly and reasonably determined would im-
prove his or her mental or physical health. The eventual effec-
tiveness of these expenditures is irrelevant. Note that the
plaintiff may also recover damages for services voluntarily ren-
dered even where the plaintiff did not incur an expense with
respect to that service, though these damages may be subject to
a trust in favour of the third party who performed the services.8 2
Where it can be shown that an expense would have been neces-
sary even if the injury had not occurred, the expense will not be
recoverable. 3 The plaintiff must itemize the expenses under
this head of the pecuniary loss claim.
2. Damages for Future Loss of Working Capacity (General
Damages)
Traditionally known as loss of earnings, this head of damage is
now identified as loss of working capacity to better recognize the
several negative losses experienced by an injured plaintiff. A
negative loss is the deprivation of a desirable item (such as the
lost opportunity to obtain a promotion) as opposed to the acqui-
sition of an undesirable item, the latter being characterized as a
positive loss (such as rehabilitation costs).4 Damages for future
loss of working capacity are assessed according to their simple
probability, but the assessment requires the estimation of the
value of the plaintiffs work, an actuarial determination of the
period of loss, any adjustment for contingencies, the application
of a discount rate, any reduction for overlap or reduced need,
and any deduction of collateral benefits. 85
82 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 173, 187.
83 Id. at 164.
a4 Id. at 90, 202.
85 Id. at 203-04.
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a. Loss of Earnings
The plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all pecuniary
gains that he or she would have made but for the injury. The
onus is on the plaintiff to establish a real and substantial risk of
loss of future income. Under this head, the plaintiff can recover
projected salary loss and loss of benefits as well as loss of busi-
ness profits and/or losses associated with the inability to pursue
other income-producing activities. While the determination of
the award under this head is partly mathematical, the court will
consider all relevant factors and make an award that is reasona-
ble in the circumstances.
Loss of earnings is calculated by subtracting from the income
that the plaintiff would have earned between the date of trial
and retirement the income that the plaintiff is now expected to
earn over the same period. This net loss figure is then adjusted
for life expectancy and a calculation is made of the amount that
would have to be invested at the date of trial to replace these
future net losses. 6 Loss of future pension income, if applicable,
will also be included in this calculation. 7 Damages for loss of
future earnings are calculated using gross, before-tax earnings.
Therefore, the award is not grossed-up to account for income
tax. 88
b. Loss of Homemaking Capacity
This head of loss permits the plaintiff to recover damages for
the value of household services the plaintiff would have been
able to perform but for the injury and is thus distinguishable
from the value of services the plaintiff must receive because of
the injury.8 9 This loss includes impairment of the ability to per-
form both management and manual tasks in the household con-
text.90 While replacement cost is not the only method of
quantification of damages under this head of loss, it is the pri-
mary method of quantification. 91
86 BRUCE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
87 Id. at 20.
88 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 277.
89 Id. at 315, where the author noted that the latter would be compensated
under the cost of future care.
90 Id. at 104, 312.
91 Id. at 105, 318.
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c. Loss of Shared Family Income
Plaintiffs can recover under this head for pecuniary loss asso-
ciated with the loss of the ability to form a permanent interde-
pendent relationship or to continue to benefit therefrom.
Financial benefits of family income include joint income to
which the plaintiff would have had access and shared living ex-
penses. Courts recognize that the formation of interdependent
relationships has both positive and negative financial effects and
these effects are closely related to the individual's employment
status. The assessment will be made on statistical evidence com-
bined with consideration of actuarial evidence of the individual
plaintiffs circumstances. The award for lost family income is
generally combined with the award for loss of earnings and loss
of homemaking capacity as these heads are interrelated.
92
3. Damages for Future Cost of Care (General Damages)
Cost of future care includes medical, schooling, and personal
care expenses that will arise in the future as a result of the injury
(primarily positive losses). The plaintiff is entitled to compensa-
tion for any expenses that are reasonably necessary for rehabili-
tation or to provide the plaintiff with the lifestyle enjoyed before
the injury, insofar as money can accomplish this objective.
While the basis for an award under this head is a mathematical
calculation, the court will also consider whether the award is rea-
sonable and fair to both parties. The plaintiffs standard of
proof is that of simple probability. An award for future care is
final and it is not open to the plaintiff to return to the court to
make a further claim." In cases involving severe or catastrophic
injury, particularly where the plaintiff is young, the cost of fu-
ture care component of the damages award can involve signifi-
cant amounts of money, thus increasing the likelihood that the
issues surrounding its assessment will be hard fought. One of
the more contentious issues may be the impact of government
benefits on the plaintiff's needs and hence, the defendant's
liability. 94
In cases where the defendant is able to satisfy the court that
the plaintiff will not incur any future costs for housing and at-
tendant care because the plaintiff will live for the rest of his or
her life in an institution at no cost (because such care is govern-
92 Id. at 342-43; see also Rainaldi, supra note 9, at ch. 27, § 66.1.
93 Rainaldi, supra note 9, at ch. 27, § 58.1.
94 See Krangle v. Brisco, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 205, 4, 28 for a recent example.
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ment subsidized), it is possible that no award will be made for
this component of future care costs, or a deduction will be made
if there is only partial subsidization.95 In the last decade particu-
larly, there has been an increasing recognition by Canadian
courts of the uncertainty of the continuing provision of univer-
sal and free government benefits, leading to adoption of various
different approaches to assessing damages for future cost of care
fairly and realistically.96
The lump sum for cost of future care is calculated by taking
the base year annual cost of care and applying a growth rate to
determine how costs will change in the future during the spe-
cific time period over which the care is expected to be required.
A discount rate to reflect the present value of the future costs
and life expectancy are then factored in to arrive at a lump sum
estimate of the plaintiff's future costs of care. 7 Costs of future
care awards are grossed-up to account for income tax.98
4. Survival Actions or Fatal Accident Claims99
a. Survival Actions
Legislation across Canada permits a plaintiffs estate to com-
mence or continue a claim for personal injury damages (a "sur-
vival action") whether the plaintiff dies as a result of the
defendant's wrongful act or some other unrelated cause.' 0
95 See, e.g., Wipfli v. Britten (1984), 56 B.C.L.R. 273 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada granted January 31, 1985, but apparently abandoned;
Tronrud v. French (1991), 75 Man. R.2d 1 (C.A.); D.W. v. Canada (1999), 187
Sask. R. 21 (Q.B.).
96 See, e.g.,Jacobsen v. Nike Canada Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R.3d 63 (S.C.); Kran-
gle v. Brisco, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 205; Stein v. Sandwich West (1995), 77 O.A.C. 40
(Ont. C.A.); Cherwoniak v. Walker (1999), 81 Alta. L.R.3d 214 (Q.B.), affd
(2001), 293 A.R. 198 (C.A.); Elder v. Farrell, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2051 (S.C.) (QL).
97 BRUCE, supra note 9, at 37.
98 Id. at 45.
99 For damages recoverable in these types of claims, see infra Appendices II
and III.
100 Alberta, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27 (R.S.A., ch. S-27, § 2
(2000) (Alta.)); British Columbia, Estate Administration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
122, s. 59 (R.S.B.C., ch. 122, § 59 (1996) (B.C.)); Manitoba, Trustee Act, R.S.M.
1987, C.C.S.M. c. T160, s. 53 (R.S.M., ch. T160, § 53 (1987) (Man.)); New Bruns-
wick, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-18 (R.S.N.B., ch. S-18, § 2 (1973)
(N.B.)); Newfoundland, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. S-32 (R.S.N., ch.
S-32, § 2 (1990) (Nfld.)); Nova Scotia, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.
453 (R.S.N.S., ch. 453, § 2 (1989) (N.S.)); Nunavut and the Northwest Territo-
ries, Trustee Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. T-8, s. 31 (R.S.N.W.T., ch. T-8, § 31 (1988)
(Nun. / N.W.T.)); Ontario, Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, s. 38 (R.S.O., ch.
T.23, § 23 (1990) (Ont.)); Prince Edward Island, Survival of Actions Act,
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Theoretically, the damages are assessed in the same manner as
they would be had the action been brought by the plaintiff: i.e.,
according to the compensatory principles, using the actuarial
method and on the basis of simple probability. In practice, how-
ever, the estate's right to recover damages is more limited than
that of the plaintiff had he or she survived. The primary heads
of recovery in a claim brought by the plaintiffs estate are for
pecuniary loss and, in particular, for those losses incurred by the
deceased up to the date of death: pre-death loss of working ca-
pacity; and past cost of care and other expenses, whether or not
they have crystallized.'0 1
The majority of survival action statutes limit the estate's right
of recovery to those actual pecuniary (or monetary, or financial)
losses suffered by the deceased or the estate, with the probable
result that the estate is impliedly prohibited from recovering fu-
ture loss of earnings. 10 2 Other statutes expressly exclude recov-
ery for loss of earnings after death. 0 3 On the other hand, some
of the statutes provide that an assessment of damages shall take
into consideration any gain, profit, or advantage to the wrong-
doer's estate, thereby preventing unjust enrichment.?14 Further-
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-I1 (R.S.P.E.I., ch. S-1i, § 4 (1988) (P.E.I.)); Saskatchewan,
Survival of Actions Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. 66.1 (S.S., ch. 66.1, § 3 (1990-91) (Sask.));
and the Yukon Territory, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 212 (R.S.Y., ch.
212, § 2 (2002) (Yukon)).
101 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 721-726.
102 See, e.g., Nova Scotia, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453, s. 4
(R.S.N.S., ch. 453, § 4 (1989) (N.S.)). New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and
Prince Edward Island have similarly worded legislation.
103 See, e.g., British Columbia, Estate Administration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 122,
s. 59(3)(c) (R.S.B.C., ch. 122, § 59(3)(c) (1996) (B.C.)); and Saskatchewan, Sur-
vival of Actions Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. S-66.1, s. 6(2) (S.S., ch. S-66.1, § 6(2) (1990-
91) (Sask.)). The Yukon Territory expressly excludes recovery of damages for
expectancy of earnings but it does so in section 59(3) (c) of the Estate Adminis-
tration Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 77 (R.S.Y., ch. 77, § 59(3)(c) (2002) (Yukon)). Al-
berta also explicitly precludes recovery of damages for future earnings including
future loss of earning capacity in the Survival of Actions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27,
s. 5(2)(c) (R.S.A., ch. S-27, § 5(2)(c) (2000) (Alta.)). The current position in
Alberta reflects a 2002 amendment to the statute to counter the effect of two
controversial decisions that permitted recovery of damages for future loss of earn-
ings. See Galand Estate v. Stewart (1992), 6 Alta. L.R.3d 399 (C.A.); Duncan Es-
tate v. Baddeley (1997), 50 Alta. L.R.3d 202 (C.A.), application for leave to appeal
dismissed, [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 315 (QL).
104 See, e.g., Newfoundland, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. S-32, s. 8(2)
(R.S.N., ch. S-32, § 8(2) (1990) (Nfld.)). Note that this provision is unlikely to be
of import where a death is caused through negligence. However, critics have
noted that an assault could be motivated by profit, in which case the profit would
be recoverable. COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 727.
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more, legislation in most Canadian jurisdictions explicitly allows
the estate to recover funeral expenses or the expense of dispos-
ing of the body even though such expenses would not otherwise
be recoverable because they would ultimately be incurred in any
event.1 0
5
b. Fatal Accident Claims
Fatal accident legislation has altered the common law to per-
mit certain dependants of a deceased plaintiff to bring an action
for damages suffered by them as a result of the death of another
("fatal accident claims").106 Even so, fatal accident claims are
derivative in the sense that the dependants can only sue for
their own damages under the applicable fatal accidents legisla-
tion if the deceased could have maintained an action and recov-
ered damages had death not ensued."0 7  Although the
permissible claimants vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, eligi-
ble dependants identified by the fatal accident statutes tend to
include spouses (or common law partners), parents, children, 08
and, in more limited cases, siblings.10 9 The definitions of "par-
ent" and "child" vary as well. "Parent" can be broad enough to
include step-parents and grandparents;'1 0 and "children" can in-
clude grandchildren, step-children, or those to whom the de-
ceased stood in loco parentis.111
A dependant's right to recover non-pecuniary or punitive
damages is discussed below. In respect of pecuniary loss, a de-
105 See, e.g., Yukon Territory, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 212, s. 6
(R.S.Y., ch. 212, § 6 (2002) (Yukon)). The recovery of these expenses is fre-
quently limited to those that are reasonable, and constitute an exception to the
rule in many statutes that the damages should be calculated without reference to
any gain or loss by the estate.
106 Notably, the Ontario Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 61 (R.S.O., ch.
F.3, § 61 (1990) (Ont.)) permits statutory dependants to recover in the case of
personal injury to another as well as the wrongful death of another.
107 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 636. Prince Edward Island is the ex-
ception to this general rule and would allow dependants to recover even if the
deceased could not have maintained an action or recovered damages. Fatal Acci-
dents Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-5, s. 2(2) (R.S.P.E.I., ch. F-5, § 2(2) (1988)
(P.E.I.)).
108 See, e.g., the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Fatal Accidents Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. F-3 (R.S.N.W.T., ch. F-3, § 3(1) (1988) (Nun. / N.W.T.)).
109 See, e.g., New Brunswick, Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-7, s. 3(1)
(R.S.N.B., ch. F-7, § 3(1) (1973) (N.B.)).
110 See, e.g., British Columbia, Family Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 126,
s. 1 (R.S.B.C., ch. 126, § 1 (1996) (B.C.)).
111 See, e.g., Manitoba, The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.M. 1987, C.C.S.M. c. F50, s.
1 (R.S.M., ch. F50, § 1 (1987) (Man.)).
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pendant is generally entitled to recover some of his or her pecu-
niary loss and typical heads of recovery include special damages
(pre-trial expenses), future loss of shared family income (depen-
dency on income), future loss of family work (dependency on
valuable services), and future loss of wealth (inheritance or es-
tate). 12 As with a survival action, damages in a fatal accident
claim are assessed in much the same way as they would be had
the plaintiff brought the action inter vivos. Damages are
awarded in a one-time lump sum that is assessed on the basis of
actuarial evidence, and in accordance with the compensatory
principle."' Regardless of the number of eligible dependants,
only one fatal accident claim may be brought." 4 Therefore,
each dependant's losses will be separately assessed and then ad-
ded together to arrive at a final sum." 5
It is important to recall that in a fatal accident claim brought
by dependants, the deceased's anticipated expenditures will be
taken into account in assessing a dependant's damages. That is,
the deceased plaintiff would have spent some of his or her in-
come on basic necessities, pleasurable activities, family and com-
munity contributions. Moreover, that income would have been
taxable." 6 Damage awards for dependants will be based on the
deceased plaintiff's after-tax earnings, but subsequently grossed-
up to allow for future taxation. 117 The awards are also subject to
adjustments for contingencies and will be discounted to allow
for inflation and investment."' The dependants may also be en-
titled to management fees." 9 Finally, note that where a depen-
dant inherits damages awarded pursuant to a survival action,
they may have to be taken into account in assessing damages in
a fatal accident claim.120
5. Collateral Benefits
Collateral benefits are benefits or payments received by the
plaintiff and provided by or at the expense of a third party in-
stead of being paid for personally by the plaintiff. The British
112 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 640-41.
113 Id. at 642-46.
114 Id. at 635.
315 Id. at 648.
116 Id. at 653.
117 Id. at 665, 707-09.
118 Id. at 700-07.
119 Id. at 648-49.
120 Id. at 719.
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Columbia Court of Appeal has defined the term "collateral ben-
efits" as follows:
In general terms, collateral benefits are payments or benefits re-
ceived by a tort victim (aside from the damages being claimed
against the tortfeasor) which the tort victim would not have re-
ceived but for the tort. The most common of these benefits are:
private insurance proceeds, gifts from friends, contributions
from charitable organizations, and a variety of statutory benefits,
including Canada Pension Plan, Employment Insurance, Disabil-
ity Pensions, Social Assistance Benefits, subsidized medical care,
Workers' Compensation, criminal injuries compensation, No-
fault Automobile Insurance Benefits, and so on .... 121
Government or statutory benefits are merely one type of col-
lateral benefit, but in Canada, where the social safety net is ar-
guably a defining socio-cultural characteristic, they represent a
significant category of collateral benefits. Government subsidies
paid to a third party to defray the cost of goods or services pro-
vided to the plaintiff by the third party (such as a hospital, physi-
otherapist, residential care facility, or school) would also come
within this definition, as would wage replacement benefits paid
pursuant to a statutory scheme or private contract. One of the
controversial, difficult, and changing areas of Canadian per-
sonal injury damages law is the treatment of collateral benefits
within the overall methodology of damages assessment.
The basic principle of avoidance of double recovery that was
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ratych v.
Bloomer122 and Cunningham v. W/heeler 12 3 -two of the leading
121 M.B. v. British Columbia (2002), 99 B.C.L.R.3d 256, 16 (C.A.). The Su-
preme Court of Canada's judgment on appeal was released October 2, 2003, after
this paper was submitted for the ABA Aviation and Space Law Committee TIPS
Conference proceedings. See M.B. v. British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 477. In
what was technically dicta, the court reversed some of the British Columbia Court
of Appeal's rulings about the treatment of social assistance benefits in the con-
text of tort damages award assessments. Id.
122 Ratych v. Bloomer, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 940. Ratych dealt with the deductibility
of collateral benefits received by an employee from an employer pursuant to a
collective agreement. Id. In Ratych, Justice McLachlin (now Chief Justice of Ca-
nada) re-emphasized the fundamental principle that the policy of tort law is to
compensate the plaintiff and not to punish the defendant, and that the plaintiff
is entitled only to full compensation, and not more. Id. 21. A failure to deduct
collateral benefits amounts to double compensation or a windfall to the plaintiff
and is to be avoided. Id. 22. Justice McLachlin reasoned that where the benefit
was received pursuant to a collective agreement, the plaintiff had not made a
direct personal contribution to a privately-funded benefit. Therefore, the benefit
did not come within the private insurance exception to the deduction for collat-
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cases on the collateral benefits issue-remains a fundamental
aspect of damage assessment and is the source of the concern
with collateral benefits. If a plaintiff will not incur any personal
costs with respect to certain required goods or services because
those services or goods (the benefit) will be provided to him or
her at the expense of a third party such as government (i.e., by a
collateral source), if the benefit is a compensatory payment (i.e.,
an indemnity payment) but not a private insurance payment,
and if the third party has no right of subrogation in respect of
such costs, then prima facie, no award to cover the cost of those
eral benefits principle, so a deduction should be made to avoid over-compensat-
ing the plaintiff. Id. 52. But the apparent sweep of Ratych must be interpreted
in light of the tempering effect of the same court's subsequent decision in Cun-
ningham v. Wheeler, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 359, sub nom. Cooper v. Miller, which varied
the characterization of collateral benefits received pursuant to a collective agree-
ment or employment contract.
123 Cunningham v. Wheeler, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 359. In a 4 to 3 split decision, the
majority held that the private insurance exception to the rule against double re-
covery should be extended to payments received for loss of wages or disability
benefits obtained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Id. 31. Jus-
tice Cory, writing also for Justices Sopinka, Iacobucci and Major, held that the
benefits for which employees have bargained in good faith should not be sacri-
ficed simply because the mode of payment for such benefits is different from that
in private insurance contracts. The majority held that as long as evidence is ad-
duced showing that the employee-plaintiff pays in some manner for the benefits
obtained under the collective agreement or contract of employment, then the
insurance exception should apply, so that no deduction would be made from the
plaintiff's award. Id. Proof of such payment would require evidence that the
employee gave up some type of consideration in return for the benefits. Id.
34-38. Justices McLachlin, La Forest, and L'Heureux-Dub6 dissented in part.
They were of the view that where a plaintiff is indemnified for lost wages through
disability benefits under a collective agreement or by payment from an employer,
the plaintiff has suffered no loss and therefore is not entitled to compensation in
respect of that head of damage. They reasoned that the tortfeasor should not be
viewed as benefiting at the plaintiffs expense because the plaintiff would make
the payments for the benefits regardless of whether or not the accident occurred.
Id. 76-78.
The divergence of judicial opinion about the proper way to give effect to the
compensatory principles of tort law, while not putting the plaintiff at risk for
under-recovery with respect to costs that are subsidized by third party (particu-
larly government) payments, is reflected in the case law. Different courts solve
the problem different ways and even within a single jurisdiction, there does not
appear to be complete unanimity of approach. It seems to be the view of the
commentators that simple reference to the basic compensatory principle does
not resolve the collateral benefits problem. Larger policy issues are in play and
must be accounted for when deciding whether or not to make deductions. For a
taste of some of the academic discussion on these issues, see
COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 565 et seq. and WADDAMS, supra note 9, at p.
3-91, 3.1750.
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goods or services should be made to the plaintiff. Alternatively,
if the plaintiff will incur some costs, but will also receive subsidi-
zation from collateral sources, then corresponding deductions
relating to those types of costs should be made from the dam-
ages award. The Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision in
Krangle (Guardian ad litem oj) v. Brisco124 reiterates the principle
of avoidance of double recovery, although it may also be viewed
as acknowledging the additional uncertainties now facing liti-
gants, judges, and juries in making an accurate and fair assess-
ment of the costs of future care where the plaintiff does or will
access government services or programs, or other collateral ben-
efits. It is the treatment of collateral benefits in relation to the
assessment of general prospective pecuniary damages, and par-
ticularly the cost of future care, that is likely to be the most con-
tentious and problematic.
Historically, in personal injury cases, no deduction was made
for payments received or receivable by plaintiffs from third par-
ties because there was a disinclination, as a matter of social pol-
icy, "to 'subsidize' the wrongdoer by treating such benefits as
credits against the damages payable.' 1 25 There was also a con-
cern that if such credit were given, the effect would be to dis-
courage charitable efforts because contributors would be
shocked at the notion that the plaintiff should be denied the
benevolence of third parties and that the defendant should ben-
efit from it.126 This rationale for non-deduction from the plain-
tiff's damage award is still applied for gifts and private charity
conferred on the plaintiff, although the courts will now some-
times invoke trust or restitutionary principles to require the
plaintiff to repay the third party once recovery is obtained from
the defendant.12 v It is arguable that government benefits are
not equivalent to charitable gifts because they are publicly
funded through tax dollars and hence are benefits conferred by
society as a whole, as a matter of public policy, on individuals
who suffer misfortune. The cases have responded to this argu-
ment in different ways. Government benefits that are not char-
acterized as compensatory or in the nature of an indemnity may
124 Krangle v. Brisco, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 205.
125 CASSELS, supra note 9, at 111, 377.
126 Id. at 380-381 (citing Redpath v. Belfast & County Down Ry., [1947] N.I.
167; Parry v. Cleaver, [1970] A.C. 1, 14 (P.C.); Cunningham v. Wheeler, [1994] 1
S.C.R. 359, 370).
127 Id. at 381.
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be analogized to charitable gifts. In such instances, no deduc-
tion will be made from the tort award.121
In addition to the charitable contribution exception to the
principle that deduction for collateral benefits should be made
from compensatory pecuniary damages awards, a second excep-
tion is made where the collateral benefit received by the plaintiff
is a privately-funded insurance benefit or should be character-
ized as such. 129 Such benefits include accident, disability, or life
insurance policy payments for which the plaintiff has privately
paid premiums, or pension or wage indemnity benefits con-
ferred through the plaintiffs employment contract where there
is proof that the plaintiff has made some form of sacrifice or
contribution in exchange for the benefit. 130 Simply put, if the
plaintiff has purchased or contributed towards such additional
protection at his or her own expense, directly or indirectly, then
those insurance benefits are not taken into account in assessing
damages.
The third exception to the collateral benefits deduction prin-
ciple arises where the third party conferring the benefit has a
right of subrogation against the recipient of the benefit. In such
scenarios, the plaintiff will end up under-compensated where a
deduction is made from the plaintiffs award because he or she
has received the benefit, but the third party can then pursue the
plaintiff for indemnification if the plaintiff is compensated by
128 The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in M.B. v. British
Columbia (2002), 99 B.C.L.R.3d 256 (C.A.) illustrates this approach. The case
addressed, inter alia, whether social assistance benefits should be deducted from
the plaintiffs past loss of earnings award on the basis that such benefits are in-
tended as wage replacement benefits. Justice Prowse refused to find that social
assistance benefits are wage replacement payments, and characterized such bene-
fits as akin to a charitable gift and therefore coming within the charitable gift
exception to the rule against double recovery in tort damage awards. The law in
other Canadian provinces on the proper characterization of social assistance ben-
efits is not necessarily the same as that of British Columbia. See, e.g., M.Y. v. Bout-
ros, [2002] 6 W.W.R. 463 (Alta. Q.B.). In its recently released decision on the
appeal of M.B. v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with
Justice Prowse's characterization of social assistance benefits as equivalent to
charitable gifts. Rather, such benefits were found to be wage indemnity pay-
ments that should be deducted from any pre-trial wage loss award. Technically,
because the British Columbia government's appeal on the vicarious liability issue
was allowed, resulting in dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, there was no actual
need to address the damages assessment issues raised on appeal. However, the
court stated that the damages issues should be canvassed briefly "in the interest of
providing guidance on the issues raised." See [2003] 2 S.C.R. 477, 19.
129 Cunningham v. Wheeler, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 359.
130 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 567-68.
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another for the same loss for which the third party made pay-
ment. Subrogation rights of third parties must also be taken
into account if the right is exercisable directly against the
tortfeasors. In such cases, the plaintiff should not recover
equivalent damages from the tortfeasors because the plaintiff is
not out-of-pocket, and the tortfeasors would be paying twice if
both the plaintiff and the third party were to recover. It should
be noted that many third party payors of insurance-like benefits
retain a contractual or statutory right of subrogation. 13 1 Thus,
in respect of such benefits, there are two bases-the private in-
surance exception and the subrogation exception-for not mak-
ing a collateral benefits deduction.
The potential availability of government benefits particularly
complicates the assessment of damages for future care costs be-
cause basic damages principles dictate that the assessment must
be made once and for all at the time of trial, but must also en-
sure, as accurately as possible, full and fair 13 2 compensation to a
plaintiff while not overcompensating at the expense of the de-
fendant. Defendants will argue that they should not be respon-
sible for costs that have been or will be covered by a third party
and therefore not incurred or payable by the plaintiff, and that
if they are required to cover costs that are in fact paid for or
subsidized by the government or another third party source, the
plaintiff is getting a windfall and the defendant is being penal-
ized rather than simply being required to fully compensate the
plaintiff.133
131 Id. at 568.
132 Cassels writes:
[W]hile the award must be "fair to both parties," the means of the
defendant are irrelevant and the plaintiff is entitled to all expenses
that can be justified and supported as expenditures that would be
incurred by a reasonable person in the plaintiff's circumstances.
Fairness has nothing to do with the defendant's ability to pay. It is
achieved by ensuring that the plaintiffs claim is reasonable and
justifiable.
CASSELS, supra note 9, at 119 (citing Thornton v. Prince George School Dist. No.
57, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267, which was one of the "trilogy" of Supreme Court of
Canada decisions on the assessment of damages in personal injury cases).
133 A case that illustrates this type of reasoning is Wipfli v. Britten (1984), 56
B.C.L.R. 273, 74 (C.A.), in which the court held that the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to recover from the defendant expenses that would be covered by govern-
ment. CASSELS, supra note 9, at 122 (citing Wipfli and Semenoff v. Kokan, (1990),
42 B.C.L.R.2d 6 (S.C.), varied by (1990), 45 B.C.L.R.2d 294 (S.C.), varied by
(1991), 59 B.C.L.R.2d. 195 (C.A.) as authority for the rule that "Where there is
no right of subrogation, and the expenses will clearly and certainly be covered by a
government agency, the plaintiff may not include these items in the claim"). Wip-
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One of the counter-arguments at the policy level is that tort
law includes a deterrence element, which dictates that
tortfeasors should bear the full cost of their wrongdoing.1 4 Fur-
thermore, the risk in accepting the argument that over-compen-
sation must be rigorously avoided (and so deduction should be
made for collateral, and especially government benefits) is that,
although apparently available, in reality, the government bene-
fits may be denied to the plaintiff either outright or at some
future time. Another risk is that the government may stop cov-
ering such costs or may introduce a user fee for which provision
has not been made in the damage award. If any of these contin-
gencies occurs, the plaintiffs award will have been reduced on
the expectation of a collateral recovery that does not in fact oc-
cur. Alternatively, in respect of some types of expenditures that
are initially provided at no cost to a plaintiff, the government
may claim a right of indemnity or subrogation and seek reim-
bursement from the plaintiff if the plaintiff recovers damages
for those expenses from the defendant. If the government seeks
indemnification from the plaintiff, who then has to reimburse
the government, then the plaintiff will not have been fully com-
pensated if a deduction has been made from the damage award
on the basis that the government will pay for those costs.
It is clear from the cases that detailed evidence about the na-
ture and structure of the government benefits in issue, the plain-
tiffs eligibility for those benefits, and the sustainability of the
benefits program will be important to determining whether vari-
ous government benefits should be deducted from a particular
plaintiffs pecuniary loss award. If it can be shown that: (1) a
plaintiff will not be eligible for certain programs (perhaps be-
cause of a family means eligibility test, or because the handicaps
or injuries are not sufficiently severe); (2) that the program is
policy-based instead of being mandated and structured by legis-
lation and is therefore much more susceptible to discontinu-
ance depending on political developments; or (3) that there is a
recognized funding crisis in respect of a program such that in
reality its ability to deliver goods or services must be questioned
on a reasonable analysis, then such factors should influence a
fli dealt with whether account should be taken of the near-certainty that the
plaintiff would live in an institution for his entire life and that the associated costs
would be covered by government subsidization of the institution. Wipfli (1984),
56 B.C.L.R. 273 74.
134 CASSELS, supra note 9, at 378. For a more detailed analysis of the competing
policy issues, see COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at ch. 9 - Collateral Benefits.
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court to treat the cost of the goods or services that might be paid
for by government as being expenses for which the plaintiff
should receive an award, rather than allowing no recovery or
reducing an award by amounts notionally available from or sup-
plied by the government.
The commentators identify that where the evidence shows
that government benefits, to some level, will be available but
there is uncertainty about the extent to which they will remain
available to the particular plaintiff, a court has three basic op-
tions: (1) to allow potential double recovery by the plaintiff by
making no deduction for the government benefits; (2) to de-
duct from the future care award, thereby potentially under-com-
pensating the plaintiff and providing a windfall to the
defendant; or (3) to try to achieve reimbursement of the party
who actually does incur the cost.135 Professor Cooper-Stephen-
son has described the ways in which the last option may be im-
plemented as follows:
The legal mechanisms for achieving the third solution include:
(a) the doctrine of subrogation; (b) the imposition of a trust or
direction for repayment of the third party benefactor; (c) the
creation of a statutory right of action by the third party against
the tortfeasors; and (d) respect for conditional benefits - bene-
fits received on condition that, if damages are awarded, repay-
ment will be made. 13 6
Plaintiffs who aim to persuade a court that no deduction for
government benefits availability should be made from the future
care award should develop an argument that suggests to the
court a reasonable and theoretically-sound basis for deviating
from the basic "no-double-recovery" rule.
To summarize with respect to collateral benefits, the starting
point under current Canadian law is that damage awards should
include deduction for collateral benefits (such as government
benefits) that are compensatory in nature, for which the plain-
tiff does not pay, and that result in the plaintiff not incurring
costs that he or she would otherwise have to pay for personally.
However, there are exceptions to this basic rule so that a deduc-
tion is not made where the collateral benefit is characterized as
a charitable gift or a privately-funded insurance payment, or
135 Ratych v. Bloomer, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 940, 978 (describing this last option as
"readjustment of the loss, usually involving transferring the benefit to the third
party").
136 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 566.
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where the payor of the collateral benefit has a right of subroga-
tion against the plaintiff as recipient of the benefit. 137 Moreo-
ver, despite this starting point, it is apparent from recent cases
that many judges will take judicial notice of the fact that in the
current socio-economic climate, it cannot be said with certainty
that government benefits-even those that we currently view as
universal and free-can reasonably be viewed as being guaran-
teed to remain available in the future on the same basis as at
present. Consequently, if a court is persuaded that there is in-
sufficient certainty that benefits will continue to be available to
the plaintiff into the future, it may refuse to make any deduction
at all based simply on the current availability of such benefits.1 38
Alternatively, it may refuse to award damages with respect to
costs that are expected to be covered from a government collat-
eral source, but it may add a contingency award to address the
chance that in the future, the availability of the collateral bene-
fits will change to the plaintiffs detriment.
39
6. Subrogation
A simplistic definition of subrogation is that it involves the
substitution of one person in the place of another.1 40 A right of
subrogation, whether afforded by contract, statute, or common
law, is often thought of as allowing the subrogated party to
"stand in the shoes" of another person and be subsumed to that
person's rights, claims, and remedies vis-a-vis third parties. This
is the first aspect of subrogation. But it is the second aspect of
subrogation-an insurer's right "to recover from its insured any
benefits actually received by him from a third party in diminu-
tion of the loss"'I-that has the potential to dramatically affect
a plaintiffs actual recovery, and hence is of considerable impor-
tance in assessing personal injury and wrongful death damages.
137 Under certain statutory benefit schemes, the government confers no-fault
benefits but retains a right of subrogation not only against third parties but also
potentially against the benefit recipient in the last resort. The same scheme may
also provide for mandatory deductions from tort damage awards based on the
plaintiffs right (even if unexercised) to receive such no-fault benefits. In such
scenarios, the interface between the collateral benefits and subrogation issues is
complicated, particularly where the situation involves defendants, plaintiffs, and
third party benefit providers from different jurisdictions.
138 See, e.g.,Jacobsen v. Nike Canada Ltd. (1996), 19 B.C.L.R.3d 63, 199-200.
(S.C.).
139 See, e.g., Krangle v. Brisco, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 205, 43.
140 HENRY SHELDON, THE LAw OF SUBROGATION 1 (2d ed. 1893).
141 S.R. DERHAM, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE LAw 1 (1985).
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In the context of personal injury damages assessments, subro-
gation interrelates with the collateral benefits issues discussed
earlier because in the majority of cases, the third parties who
provide collateral benefits to plaintiffs are insurers, or tanta-
mount to insurers. These third parties often acquire, by con-
tract or by statute,142 the right to subrogate, not only against
third parties, but also against the plaintiff who is treated like an
insured. It would seem, however, that the right to subrogate
against one's own insured, who has recovered from a third
party, is an equity-based right, although it may also be rein-
forced or reiterated by contract or legislation. Where insurers
seek indemnification directly from their own insureds based on
contractual rights articulated in the insurance policy, the courts
construe the insurers' rights strictly.143
In each Canadian provincial or territorial jurisdiction there
are various government-related bodies that are mandated to
provide various benefits to persons injured or killed, or to their
dependants. Such bodies include workers' compensation
boards, hospital insurance commissions, departments of health,
and government disability programs. Many of these bodies have
statutory rights of subrogation, which often purport to amplify
or modify common law rights of subrogation. A table listing the
statutory provisions in each province and territory that provide
these types of bodies with subrogation rights is found in Appen-
dix IV. 141
Where a third party who confers a collateral benefit has a
right of subrogation against the plaintiff, the plaintiff will not be
over-compensated if he or she recovers damages for the loss or
injury addressed by the collateral benefit, because upon receipt
of the damage award, the plaintiff can be forced to reimburse
the third party. This is the rationale for the subrogation excep-
tion to the damages assessment principle that a deduction
142 There may also be common law rights of subrogation, although these may
be less robust than those conferred by contract or statute.
143 See, e.g., Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. McLaren (1886), 12 O.R. 682 (Ch. D.); Con-
federation Life Ins. Co. v. Causton (1989), 38 B.C.L.R.2d 69 (C.A.). One of the
leading cases on subrogation is Gibson v. Sun Life Assurance of Canada Ltd.
(1984), 45 O.R.2d 326 (H.CJ.). Cooper-Stephenson discusses the issue of subro-
gation as a component of the broader issue of collateral benefits. COOPER-
STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 614-620.
144 The table set out in Appendix IV does not include any of the pertinent
motor vehicle accident insurance legislation because it would not apply in avia-
tion cases. However, much of the case law addressing subrogation by govern-
ment entities could be expected to arise in the motor vehicle accident context.
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should be made to take account of collateral benefits conferred
on the plaintiff. What is difficult in the context of damage as-
sessment is ensuring that an accurate and fair account is taken
of the various potential rights of subrogation that may come into
play.
One of the areas relating to subrogation that has the potential
to raise difficult issues is the scope of provincial statutory quasi-
insurer's subrogation rights in relation to parties in other juris-
dictions. Different provincial legislative schemes may conflict,
as may the common law rules in different provinces for dealing
with collateral benefits and subrogation in the assessment of
personal injury damages, potentially giving rise to constitutional
jurisdiction issues. This can affect the extent to which a local
court will permit a foreign insurer or quasi-insurer to exercise
subrogation rights against a local defendant. For example, in
some British Columbia cases involving motor vehicle accident
claims, the British Columbia Court of Appeal refused to permit
a foreign insurer to exercise subrogation rights against a British
Columbia defendant on the basis that the foreign statutory sub-
rogation provisions in question conflicted with local laws regard-
ing liability for damages. 145 Although these cases are very
specific to their facts, including the particulars of the legislative
schemes involved, they highlight one of the uncertainties in re-
spect of subrogation rights.
Generally, it has been the case that tortfeasors and their vic-
tims could expect private insurers to fully exercise their rights of
subrogation. But that has not always been so with Canadian
quasi-insurers, such as provincial government hospital insurance
administrators and workers' compensation boards, who may
have had certain statutory as well as common law rights of subro-
gation but often did not exercise them, or who were viewed as
not having subrogation rights at all. 146 There appears, however,
145 United States of America v. Bulley (1991), 55 B.C.L.R.2d 212, 8. (C.A.).
See Matilda v. MacLeod; Schaffer v. McPherson (2000), 182 D.L.R.4th 331, 7
(B.C.C.A.).
146 Semenoff v. Kokan (1990), 42 B.C.L.R.2d 6 (S.C.), varied by (1990), 45
B.C.L.R.2d 294 (S.C.), varied by (1991), 59 B.C.L.R.2d 195 (C.A.) (illustrating the
interaction between deduction for government benefits and rights of the govern-
ment entity to subrogate). In SemenoffJustice Hutcheon, for the court, described
the decision in Flaherty v. Hughes (1952), 6 W.W.R. (N.S.) 289 (B.C.C.A.) as
follows:
But as I understand the decision in Flaherty and the decision in Wip-
fli the rationale in each case was that the plaintiff was not able to
show he had suffered a loss; he was under no legal liability to pay
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to be an increasing tendency for these quasi-insurers to actively
and aggressively pursue their subrogation rights not only against
third parties responsible for a plaintiff-insured's injuries and
losses, but also against plaintiffs themselves who recover tort
awards.147 This development may affect the ultimate exposure
faced by defendants in personal injury or wrongful death claims,
and may also mandate different approaches by both plaintiffs
and defendants to settlement and/or litigation in that the possi-
bility of subrogated claims and the indemnification obligations
of the plaintiff to the insurer or quasi-insurer may have to be
factored into case management strategies.
In dealing with personal injury damage claims, counsel will
have to keep in mind the possibility of subrogated claims by
such government bodies. The structure and particulars of each
statutory scheme, even if addressing the same area of benefits or
compensation, is not necessarily the same from province to
province, and therefore cases involving specific statutory
schemes may not be useful in assessing issues that arise under
different legislation.
B. NON-PECUNARY Loss (GENERAL DAMAGES)
1. General Principles
Non-pecuniary damages are general damages intended to
compensate a plaintiff for intangible injuries including pain and
suffering, loss of amenities (or loss of enjoyment of life), and
the hospital and therefore was not entitled to be indemnified by
the wrongdoer.
Id. 31.
The issue in Semenoff was whether or not the British Columbia Medical Services
Commission had a right to bring a subrogated claim in Semenoff s action against
the defendant for recovery of expenses paid on behalf of the Commission for
medical services rendered to Semenoff. The Commission's subrogation right was
predicated on the plaintiff having a "right of action against a third person for the
amount" paid by the Commission. It was concluded, applying Wipfli, that be-
cause Semenoff had not incurred any cost or suffered any loss, he had no right of
action against the defendant for those costs, and therefore the Commission did
not have a subrogated claim and could not recover its expenses as against the
defendant. As it was put by Justice Hutcheon: "I am compelled by the decisions
in Flaherty, Heltman, [Heltman v. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines Ltd.
(1966), 57 W.W.R. 440 (B.C.C.A.)] and Wipfli to hold that because Gordon Seme-
noff was under no legal obligation to pay the medical expenses, he has no right
to recover them from Dr. Kokan." Id. 34.
147 See, e.g., Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, represented by the
Ontario Minister of Health v. Medwid, Court File No. 97-CV-133871SR. (Ont.
Gen. Div.).
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loss of expectation of life. Non-pecuniary damages may also in-
clude an award of aggravated damages. Non-pecuniary loss is
assessed using a functional approach based on the plaintiff's
overall psychological condition and his or her need for solace.
Solace "is taken to mean physical arrangements which can make
[the plaintiffs] life more endurable, 148 potentially leading to
the strange result that a severely injured plaintiff who is unaware
of her surroundings may not be entitled to recover any damages
under this head. Alternatively, the award of non-pecuniary dam-
ages may be assessed taking into consideration a plaintiff's re-
duced ability to appreciate what has been lost.149
Because these damages are based on a philosophical or policy
approach rather than a legal or logical approach,15 the func-
tional approach has been modified to the extent that the plain-
tiff is not required to prove that the damages will provide him
with solace and the court will not adjust the damages award to
allow for positive or negative contingencies. Instead, the dam-
ages are awarded in a single lump sum (that is, they are assessed
globally) taking into consideration awards in comparable cases,
the plaintiffs need for solace depending on the extent and du-
ration of the injury as well as the utility of this kind of damages
award, the effect of inflation, and any concerns about overlap
between types of damages or reduced need. 5' As a general
rule, non-pecuniary damages do not need to be itemized be-
cause they are awarded in a lump sum, but the traditional cate-
gories of loss, articulated above, provide guidance as to the types
of intangible losses that are compensable. It is important to em-
phasize that quantification of non-pecuniary damages is not a
mechanical or systematized process driven by blind reference to
monetary valuations of various types of intangible loss. Rather,
the courts attempt to fashion a fair award in the specific circum-
stances of the case. Consequently, plaintiffs who suffer the same
injuries might each receive different awards of non-pecuniary
damages.
Despite the fact that non-pecuniary damages are within the
discretion of the trial judge (or jury) in Canadian personal in-
jury cases, they are subject to a rough upper limit, or a cap (the
"Cap"), which applies in the case of severe or catastrophic inju-
148 Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 262.
149 See, e.g., McGlone v. Kelly (2002), 5 B.C.L.R.4th 134 (S.C.).
150 CoOPER-Stephenson, supra note 3, at 495.
15! Id. at 512.
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ries such as quadriplegia or profound brain injury.152 Intro-
duced by the Trilogy, a set of three Supreme Court of Canada
cases, the Cap recognizes the need for relative consistency in
awards and the need to limit the social burden of excessive
awards of non-pecuniary damages. When the first of the Trilogy
decisions, Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., was decided in
January 1978, the Cap was set at $100,000. The Cap is adjusted
for inflation using the current consumer price index and is cur-
rently somewhat in excess of $290,000.1'
The Cap should not be exceeded unless special or excep-
tional circumstances justify an increased award. In 1995, the Su-
preme Court of Canada took the opportunity to reiterate that
the Cap is a legal limit on non-pecuniary damages that was im-
posed as a "rule of law."' 54 Consequently, although it is clear
that in this area of damages assessment, courts are not rigidly
bound by prior decisions or by a requirement that they make
strictly mathematical pro rata awards depending on the nature
and extent of the injuries, one is left to wonder what would con-
stitute circumstances sufficient to permit an award in excess of
the Cap. Clearly, such circumstances will be rare. Fenn v. Peter-
152 The Cap does not apply in defamation cases because general damages serve
a different function in such cases. Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1130, 168. It has also been held, in British Columbia, that the Cap does not
apply where the cause of action is an intentional tort involving criminal beha-
viour such as sexual assault. Y.(S.) v. C.(F.G.) (1996), 26 B.C.L.R.3d 155 (C.A.).
However, the Cap was held to apply to an award of punitive damages in an incest
case. Ms. R. v. Mr. W., 2003 ABQB 50, [2003] AJ. No. 927 (QL).
153 In a recent British Columbia Supreme Court judgment decided June 27,
2003, the court stated that the current value of the Cap is $294,700. See Lee v.
Dawson (2003), 17 B.C.L.R.4th 80, 4 (S.C.). Bruce provides the method of
calculation for determining the Cap. BRUCE, supra note 9. The Trilogy provided
that the Cap is $100,000 measured in January 1978 dollars. Since that time, the
practice has been to adjust the ceiling by dividing the current CPI by the January
1978 CPI and multiplying the resulting quotient by the known (earlier) dollar
figure for the non-pecuniary damage in question. For example, to calculate the
current Cap, determine the most recent CPI (122.1 as ofJune, 2003), divide this
figure by 41.8 (the January 1978 CPI) and multiply the resulting quotient by
$100,000 (the 1978 value of the Cap). This calculation can also be used to calcu-
late the value of awards for particular non-pecuniary damage amounts at differ-
ent points in time. For example, Bruce cites the 1984 non-pecuniary award of
$60,000 for loss of a leg. BRUCE, supra note 9. The present value of the loss of a
leg according to the 1984 figure can be determined using the same calculation.
All that is required is to know the current CPI, the CPI at the time of the award,
and the amount of damages assessed for the loss in question in the earlier case.
154 ter Neuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674, 114.
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borough (City)' 55 provides one example. In that case, the Ontario
Court of Appeal awarded a severely injured plaintiff $125,000 in
non-pecuniary damages notwithstanding the Cap. The Court of
Appeal concluded that in addition to the change in the value of
money since the Trilogy had been decided (approximately one
and one half years earlier), the plaintiff had suffered more pain
than any of the plaintiffs compensated in the Trilogy.'56
2. Survival Actions or Fatal Accident Claims 57
a. Survival Actions
Arguably, non-pecuniary damages should not be recoverable
by the plaintiff's estate in survival actions because they are in-
tended to provide solace to the plaintiff. 5 Claims for non-pe-
cuniary damages are expressly excluded by statute in some
jurisdictions and seem to be excluded by implication in others.
In most Canadian jurisdictions, the survival action statutes pro-
vide that damages are limited to "actual pecuniary loss.' 59 Sev-
eral jurisdictions expressly exclude the right to recover damages
for pain and suffering, 160 disfigurement,' 6 1 loss of expectation of
155 Fenn v. City of Peterborough (1979), 25 O.R.2d 399 (C.A.), affd sub nom.
Consumers Gas Co. v. Fenn, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 613.
156 The plaintiff was horribly burned when a natural gas explosion demolished
her house and killed her three young children.
157 Damages recoverable in these types of claims are summarized in
Appendices II and III to this paper. The following discussion suggests that non-
pecuniary damages are not generally recoverable in survival actions or in fatal
accident claims. This is not the case in Quebec, however, where non-pecuniary
damages can be recovered in an action brought by the deceased plaintiff's estate
or by a dependant. See Augustus v. Gosset, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 268.
158 It seems obvious that the plaintiff would have to be alive to benefit from the
intended solace. However, in the United States, nominal awards of damages have
been made for pre-impact pain and suffering.
'5 See Alberta, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27, s. 5(1) (R.S.A., ch.
S-27, § 5(1) (2000) (Alta.)); New Brunswick, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.B.
1973, c. S-18, s. 5(1) (R.S.N.B., ch. S-18, § 5(1) (1973) (N.B.)); Newfoundland,
Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. S-32, s. 4 (R.S.N., ch. S-32, § 4 (1990)
(Nfld.)); Nova Scotia, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453, s. 4 (R.S.N.S.,
ch. 453, § 4 (1989) (N.S.)); Prince Edward Island, Survival of Actions Act,
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-11, s. 5 (R.S.P.E.I., ch. S-11, § 5 (1988) (P.E.I.)); Saskatche-
wan, Survival of Actions Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. S-66.1, s. 6(1) (S.S., ch. S-66.1, § 6(1)
(1990-91) (Sask.)); Yukon Territory, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 212, s.
5 (R.S.Y., ch. 212, § 5 (2002) (Yukon)).
160 See British Columbia, Estate Administration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 122, s.
59(3)(a) (R.S.B.C., ch. 122, § 59(3)(a) (1996) (B.C.)); Alberta, Survival of Ac-
tions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27, s. 5(2)(b) (R.S.A., ch. S-27, § 5(2)(b) (2000)
(Alta.)); Saskatchewan, Survival of Actions Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. S-66.1, s. 6(2)(c)
(S.S., ch. S-66.1, § 6(2)(c) (1990-91) (Sask.)); New Brunswick, Survival of Actions
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life, 162 or loss of amenities.' 63 Other Canadian statutes are silent
on the issue. Claims for non-pecuniary loss may be permissible
in Manitoba, Ontario, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and
to a limited extent, British Columbia.'64 Non-pecuniary dam-
ages, where recoverable, are assessed on the same basis as they
would be had the plaintiff brought the action.
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-18, s. 5(1) (R.S.N.B., ch. S-18, § 5(1) (1973) (N.B.)); Nova
Scotia, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453, s. 4(c) (R.S.N.S., ch. 453,
§ 4(c) (1989) (N.S.)); Newfoundland, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. S-
32, s. ll(g) (R.S.N., ch. S-32, § 11(g) (1990) (Nfld.)); Prince Edward Island, Sur-
vival of Actions Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-11, s. 5(c) (R.S.P.E.I., ch. S-11, § 5(c)
(1988) (P.E.I.)); Yukon Territory, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 212, s. 5
(R.S.Y., ch. 212, § 5 (2002) (Yukon)).
161 See British Columbia, Estate Administration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 122, s.
59(3)(a) (R.S.B.C., ch. 122, § 59(3)(a) (1996) (B.C.)); Alberta, Survival of Ac-
tions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27, s. 5(2)(b) (R.S.A., ch. S-27, § 5(2)(b) (2000)
(Alta.)); Saskatchewan, Survival of Actions Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. S-66.1, s. 6(2)(d)
(S.S., ch. S-66.1, § 6(2)(d) (1990-91) (Sask.)); New Brunswick, Survival of Actions
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-18, s. 5(1) (R.S.N.B., ch. S-18, § 5(1) (1973) (N.B.)); New-
foundland, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. S-32, s. I I(g) (R.S.N., ch. S-32,
§ 11 (g) (1990) (Nfld.)); Prince Edward Island, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.P.E.I.
1988, c. S-11, s. 5(d) (R.S.P.E.I., ch. S-11, § 5(d) (1988) (P.E.I.)); Yukon Terri-
tory, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 212, s. 5 (R.S.Y., ch. 212, § 5 (2002)
(Yukon)).
162 See British Columbia, Estate Administration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 122, s.
59(3)(b) (R.S.B.C., ch. 122, § 59(3)(b) (1996) (B.C.)); Alberta, Survival of Ac-
tions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27, s. 5(2)(b) (R.S.A., ch. S-27, § 5(2)(b) (2000)
(Alta.)); Saskatchewan, Survival of Actions Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. S-66.1, s. 6(2)(a)
(S.S., ch. S-66.1, § 6(2)(a) (1990-91) (Sask.)); Manitoba, Trustee Act, R.S.M.
1987, C.C.S.M. c. T160, s. 53(1) (R.S.M., ch. T160, § 53(1) (1987) (Man.)); Onta-
rio, Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, s. 38(1) (R.S.O., ch. T.23, § 38(1) (1990)
(Ont.)); New Brunswick, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. S-18, s. 5(1)
(R.S.N.B., ch. S-18, § 5(1) (1973) (N.B.)); Nova Scotia, Survival of Actions Act,
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453, s. 4(b) (R.S.N.S., ch. 453, § 4(b) (1989) (N.S.)); Prince
Edward Island, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-11, s. 5(b) (R.S.P.E.I.,
ch. S-11, § 5(b) (1988) (P.E.I.)); Yukon Territory, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.Y.
2002, c. 212, s. 5 (R.S.Y., ch. 212, § 5 (2002) (Yukon)). Neither the Northwest
Territories nor Nunavut expressly limit the right to recover damages for the loss
of expectation of life. See Trustee Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. T-8 (R.S.N.W.T., ch.
T-8 (1988) (Nun./N.W.T.)).
163 See Alberta, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27, s. 5(2)(b) (R.S.A.,
ch. S-27, § 5(2) (b) (2000) (Alta.)); Saskatchewan, Survival of Actions Act, S.S.
1990-91, c. S-66.1, s. 6(2)(e) (S.S., ch. S-66.1, § 6(2) (e) (1990-91) (Sask.); Prince
Edward Island, Survival of Actions Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-11, s. 5(b) (R.S.P.E.I.,
ch. S-11, § 5(b) (1988) (P.E.I.)).
164 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 738.
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b. Fatal Accident Claims
At common law, third parties (e.g., dependants) were gener-
ally not permitted to recover damages for their non-pecuniary
losses suffered as a result of the wrongful death of another. It
seems that this position has been altered in Alberta 165 and Nova
Scotia,16 6 but it is debatable whether this position has been statu-
torily changed in other Canadian jurisdictions. 1 67 While recov-
ery for losses in the nature of guidance, care, and
companionship is possible in many Canadian jurisdictions, re-
covery may be based on the view that these losses are properly
characterized as pecuniary rather than non-pecuniary losses.1
68
For instance, in British Columbia, 169 the legislation applicable to
fatal accident claims is somewhat ambiguous as it refers only to
"damages." It has been held that non-pecuniary damages are
not compensable, 170 but it has also been stated that an excep-
tion may exist where cultural differences justify a departure
from the general rule.' 7 1 A better explanation of the "excep-
tion" may be that loss of care and guidance is actually a pecuni-
ary loss that is more frequently awarded to children but it is a
loss recoverable by parents if the circumstances so require. The
165 Damages for "grief' or loss of "guidance, care and companionship" are
mandatory. See Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-8, s. 8 (R.S.A., ch. F-8, § 8
(2000) (Alta.)). While the loss of "guidance, care and companionship" may be
construed as a pecuniary claim, grief is an intangible loss and most probably falls
under the rubric of a non-pecuniary loss. Id.
166 Non-pecuniary damages are expressly recoverable in fatal accident claims
in Nova Scotia. See Fatal Injuries Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 163, s. 5(2) (R.S.N.S., ch.
163, § 5(2) (1989) (N.S.)).
167 The Yukon Territory limits recovery to pecuniary loss. Fatal Accidents Act,
R.S.Y. 2002, c. 86, s. 3(2) (R.S.Y., ch. 86, § 3(2) (2002) (Yukon)).
168 There is a good discussion of the issue in Balmer Estate v. Hrehirchuk
(1998), 63 B.C.L.R.3d 288 (S.C.), wherein the judge refers to Supreme Court of
Canada authority. Compare this decision and the authorities cited therein with
Lord v. Downer, [1998] O.J. No. 2623 (Gen. Div.) (QL), affid (1999), 179
D.L.R.4th 430 (Ont. C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed, [1999] S.C.C.A.
No. 571 (QL).
169 Other jurisdictions have similarly-worded statutes. See Saskatchewan, The
Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. F-11, s. 4(1) (R.S.S., ch. F-11, § 4(1) (1978)
(Sask.)); Newfoundland, Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. F-6, s. 6(1) (R.S.N.,
ch. F-6, § 6(1) (1990) (Nfld.)); the Northwest Territories, Fatal Accidents Act,
R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. F-3, s. 3(2) (R.S.N.W.T., ch. F-3, § 3(2) (1988) (N.W.T.)).
The latter statute applies in Nunavut as well.
170 See, e.g., Bianco Estate v. Fromow, (1998), 161 D.L.R.4th 765 (B.C.C.A.);
Ruiz v. Mount SaintJoseph Hospital, 2001 BCCA 207, 2001 B.C.A.C. LEXIS 143.
171 Lian v. Money (1994), 93 B.C.L.R.2d 15 (S.C.), affd on this ground (1996),
15 B.C.L.R.3d 1 (C.A.).
DAMAGES IN CANADA
Manitoba, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island statutes support
this conclusion because although they permit recovery for the
loss of "guidance, care and companionship," they also provide
that damages in fatal accident claims are limited to pecuniary
loss. 1 7 2 New Brunswick further confuses the issue by restricting
recovery to pecuniary loss in one provision, 173 but permitting
parents to recover for "grief," as well as "loss of companionship,"
in another provision. 74
In one recent Alberta case, 175 a 57-year-old man claimed dam-
ages for "grief' and "loss of guidance, care and companionship"
when his 84-year-old mother was killed in a motor vehicle acci-
dent, despite the age restriction in the Alberta statute. The
court denied the claim on the basis of his age, finding that the
statute only permitted dependants in a vulnerable age group to
recover damages under these heads. The court further con-
cluded that the legislation did not violate Section 15(1) of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.176
3. Aggravated Damages
a. Claims by the Injured Plaintiff
Aggravated damages present an exception to the general rule
that non-pecuniary damages need not be itemized. Aggravated
damages are a separate category of non-pecuniary damages de-
signed to compensate for injured feelings arising not from the
injury, but from the manner in which the wrongful act was com-
mitted. In Hill v. Church of Scientology, Justice Cory held that
"[a] ggravated damages may be awarded in circumstances where
172 See Manitoba, The Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.M. 1987, C.C.S.M. c. F50, ss. 3(2)
& 3.1 (R.S.M., ch. F50, §§ 3(2), 3.1 (1987) (Man.)) (making damages for the loss
of "guidance, care and companionship" mandatory). See Ontario, Family Law
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss. 61(1) & 61(2) (e) (R.S.O., ch. F.3, §§ 61(1), 61(2) (e)
(1990) (Ont.)) (making such damages discretionary); see also, Prince Edward Is-
land, Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-5, ss. 6(2) & 6(3) (c) (R.S.P.E.I., ch.
F-5, §§ 6(2), 6(3)(c) (1988) (P.E.I.) (permitting recovery only for pecuniary loss,
and specifically for the loss of "guidance, care and companionship" as "addi-
tional" damages).
173 New Brunswick, Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-7, s. 3(2) (R.S.N.B.,
ch. F-7, § 3(2) (1973) (N.B.)).
174 Id. § 3(5).
175 Ferraiuolo v. Olson, 2003 ABQB 330, 2003 AB. C. LEXIS 1454.
176 The plaintiff was successful, in part, in his claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity under Alberta's Survival of Actions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-27
(R.S.A., ch. S-27 (2000) (Alta.)). The court did not discuss the amendments to
the statute, but the action may have been brought prior to the amendments
prohibiting damages for prospective earnings loss.
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the defendants' conduct has been particularly high-handed or
oppressive.' 77 Hence, they are most often awarded in cases of
intentional tort such as assault or battery. Nevertheless, there is
nothing to preclude the award of aggravated damages in negli-
gence cases. 178 For example, they have been awarded where the
negligent conduct is criminal in nature. 179 Because aggravated
damages are awarded separately from the global sum for non-
pecuniary loss, it is not yet clear whether aggravated damages
form part of the overall non-pecuniary award subject to the
Cap.180
b. Survival Actions or Fatal Accident Claims
As a type of non-pecuniary loss, it is likely that claims for ag-
gravated damages in survival actions are excluded by implication
in the majority of Canadian jurisdictions.1 8 1 Only Saskatchewan
explicitly excludes claims for aggravated damages in survival ac-
tions. In every other jurisdiction, the legislation is silent, but the
case law seems to support the view that aggravated damages are
not generally recoverable in survival actions.8 2
It is evident from the general discussion on non-pecuniary
damages in fatal accident claims that a dependant's right to re-
cover non-pecuniary damages is questionable at best. The right
to recover aggravated damages is made more difficult by virtue
of the fact that the fatal accident legislation across Canada, with
one exception, is silent on the issue of non-pecuniary damages
generally and, without exception, on the issue of aggravated
damages. The safest conclusion, it seems, is that aggravated
damages are not recoverable in fatal accident claims unless the
177 Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 188.
178 Bob v. Bellerose (2003), 16 B.C.L.R.4th 56, 32 (C.A.).
179 Id.
180 Id. 3.
181 As mentioned above, most survival action statutes limit recover to actual
pecuniary loss.
182 In Allan Estate v. Co-operators Life Insurance Co. (1999), 62 B.C.L.R.3d
329, 72 (C.A.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that "[t] he damages
which may be recovered under the Estate Administration Act are the damages that
reflect a diminution of the personal estate of the deceased, whether they are for
damage or loss to the person or damage or loss to property, and nothing more."
Id.; see also Campbell v. Read (1987), 22 B.C.L.R.2d 214 (C.A.); Davie Estate v.
Yukon Territory (Commissioner), [1993] Y.J. No. 74 (S.C.) (QL); Young Estate v.
Transalta Utilities Corp., [1996] AJ. No. 138 (Q.B.) (QL).
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claim is brought in Nova Scotia, which expressly provides for the
recovery of non-pecuniary damages.1 13
IV. NON-COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
As stated in the introduction to this paper, non-compensatory
damages can be awarded in addition to those damages intended
to compensate a plaintiff. Such damages go beyond the realm
of compensation and, in the personal injury and wrongful death
context, generally aim to punish the tortfeasor and deter future
occurrences of the same wrong. Punitive or exemplary damages
are quantified having regard to several factors, including:
whether the award will serve some rational purpose; the conduct
of the parties; the quantum of the compensatory component of
the damages award; the tortfeasor's ability to pay; and any crimi-
nal proceedings or fines.' 8 4 Alternatively, non-compensatory
damages may be awarded where the plaintiff has a cause of ac-
tion against a tortfeasor but cannot adequately establish his or
her loss. As the name suggests, the sum awarded is usually triv-
ial, and accordingly, does not truly compensate the plaintiff. 8 '
A. NOMINAL DAMAGES
Nominal damages may be awarded where the plaintiff has es-
tablished a cause of action against the defendant but is unable
to establish a right to compensatory damages, recovery is other-
wise barred, or the plaintiff cannot adequately quantify his or
her loss. 1 86 Awards of nominal damages should be relatively in-
frequent in the aviation context where most actions will be
based in negligence, which requires proof of damage. Nonethe-
less, to recognize a technical infringement of rights, an award
could be made in a negligence action where the plaintiff fails to
quantify his or her loss despite the ability to do so.1 8 7
183 Nova Scotia, Fatal Injuries Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 163, s. 5(2) (R.S.N.S., ch.
163, § 5(2) (1989) (N.S.)). The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that aggra-
vated damages were not recoverable under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
F.3, s. 61 (R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 61 (1990) (Ont.)), even assuming other types of non-
pecuniary loss were recoverable. See Lord v. Downer (1999), 179 D.L.R.4th 430
(Ont. C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 571 (QL).
184 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 98-99.
185 Id. at 99-100.
186 Rainaldi, supra note 9, at ch. 27, § 1.
187 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 100-01.
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B. PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
1. Claims by the Injured Plaintiff
Punitive (or exemplary) damages fall under the rubric of non-
compensatory damages because, as their name suggests, they are
designed to punish the defendant rather than compensate the
plaintiff. Theoretically, such awards should be rare in the case
of a personal injury or wrongful death because it has been held
that they are only justified where the defendant's malicious, vin-
dictive, or reprehensible conduct constitutes an independently
actionable wrong.188 Given that most personal injury or wrong-
ful death claims in the aviation context will be based in negli-
gence, it is difficult to conceive of a situation that would attract
an award of punitive (or exemplary) damages. In practice,
courts appear to award punitive damages where the defendant's
misconduct is so outrageous that a sanction is required to pun-
ish the defendant and deter recurrences whether or not the
conduct constitutes an independently actionable wrong.189 Nev-
ertheless, punitive damages in negligence actions for personal
injury are generally limited to situations involving recklessness19 °
or bad faith.191
2. Survival Actions or Fatal Accident Claims
a. Survival Actions
Because punitive or exemplary damages are designed to pun-
ish the defendant, they should not be precluded by reason of
the plaintiffs death. However, survival action statutes expressly
exclude recovery of punitive or exemplary damages in several
jurisdictions. 9 2 While claims for punitive damages are expressly
permitted in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick, their permissi-
188 Vorvis v. I.C.B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085.
189 The requirements for an award of punitive damages are set out in Hill v.
Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 196, and were recently affirmed
in Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595.
190 Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd. (1981), 30 B.C.L.R. 286 (C.A.).
191 See Coughlin v. Kuntz (1989), 42 B.C.L.R.2d 108 (C.A.); McBeth v. Boldt
(1998), 164 D.L.R.4th 247 (B.C.C.A.).
192 Punitive damages cannot be recovered in a survival action in Alberta, the
Yukon Territory, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, or Prince Edward Island. Mani-
toba excludes recovery where the plaintiffs death is caused by the tort. See Ap-
pendix II to this paper.
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ble recovery can only be implied in other Canadian jurisdictions
where the legislation is silent.193
b. Fatal Accident Claims
The rationale for punitive or exemplary damages persists
where the claim is brought by a dependant in a fatal accident
claim, but it is not clear whether punitive damages will be
awarded. New Brunswick is exceptional insofar as it expressly
permits a dependant to recover exemplary or punitive damages
in an appropriate case notwithstanding that the statute other-
wise limits recovery to pecuniary lOSS. 1 9 4 All other legislation
dealing with fatal accident claims is silent on the issue of puni-
tive or exemplary damages. As discussed above, some of the fa-
tal accident statutes restrict recovery to pecuniary loss.' 95 This
would appear to preclude an award of punitive damages.'9 6
V. THE AVAILABILITY OF JURY TRIALS AND JUDICIAL
TREATMENT OF JURY AWARDS
Jury trials are available for all civil cases in every jurisdiction in
Canada except Quebec, which prohibits the use of juries in civil
trials.' 97 Civil jury trials are more frequent in British Columbia
and Ontario than in other Canadian jurisdictions. 98 In British
Columbia and Ontario, jury trials for personal injury have been
referred to as common,'99 but note that in a 1978 case, Justice
Bouck for the British Columbia Supreme Court stated in dicta
that "less than 2% to 3% of personal injury actions tried in Brit-
193 These provinces are British Columbia, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut,
and Ontario. In Manitoba, recovery can be implied where the plaintiff dies from
an unrelated cause.
194 New Brunswick, Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-7, s. 6(4) (R.S.N.B.,
ch. F-7, § 6(4) (1973) (N.B.)).
195 See, e.g., the Yukon Territory's Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 86, s. 3(2)
(R.S.Y., ch. 86, § 3(2) (2002) (Yukon)).
196 This was the conclusion in Lord v. Downer (1999), 179 D.L.R.4th 430 (Ont.
C.A.), application for leave to appeal dismissed, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 571 (QL); see also
Nichols v. Guiel (1983), 145 D.L.R.3d 186 (B.C.S.C.); Campbell v. Read (1987),
22 B.C.L.R.2d 214 (C.A.).
197 Jeremy Solomon, A Civil Juy: A Comparative Study of the Selection of Jurors in
Ontario and the United States, in PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR PERSONAL INJURY LAW-
YERs: "TRIcKs OF THE TRADE": PLAINTIFF AND DEFENCE STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN A
BILL 59 ENVIRONMENT 29 (2002) (QL).
198 Id.
199 WADDAMviS, supra note 9, at p. 13-25, 13.470; see also Halbot v. Little, [2003]
O.J. No. 520, 9 (QL), 2003 ON. C. LEXIS 4737, 9 (S.CJ. [Master]).
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ish Columbia are decided by a jury. ' 20 0 In a paper written on
national developments in product liability, the author stated
that jury trials for product liability claims are the exception
rather than the rule.20 1 In an Ontario paper, the author stated
that in 1996, 22% of civil cases in Ontario had jury trials and
that the majority of those cases were motor vehicle accident
cases.
20 2
Once a jury arrives at a determination on the quantum of
damages payable to the plaintiff, in British Columbia at least, a
trial judge cannot reject that finding unless there is no evidence
at all to support the jury's conclusion or unless the jury's finding
is equivocal. In this case, the trial judge can redirect the jury
and if the jury returns with the same response, may direct a new
trial. With the exception of an award of non-pecuniary damages
that exceeds the Cap, even if the jury has made an unjust or
perverse award, as long as there is some evidence to support the
award, it is generally held to be the role of the appellate court
and not the trial judge to correct it.203 The necessary conclusion
is that a trial judge is obligated to treat ajury's determination of
quantum with deference. This is consistent with the following
statement from Force v. Gibbons-
The value of the jury system is that it brings to the law the appli-
cation of the common sense existing in the community. Ifjudges
alone fix all the damages in personal injury actions it is thought
that because of the "cloistered" position they might not keep
pace with the times.
In some instances judges' awards might be too low, in others too
high. The jury, therefore, has an educating effect upon the law
because if juries consistently award damages which are markedly
different than those fixed by judges themselves then it seems the
judiciary should examine the basis for its assessments. 20 4
This passage was recently quoted with approval by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal where Justice Thackray held that
200 Force v. Gibbons (1978), 93 D.L.R.3d 626, 632 (B.C.S.C.). Cooper-Ste-
phenson wrote that personal injury claims are tried before juries on the "compar-
atively rare occasion." COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 524.
201 Robert B. Bell, Product Liability: Recent Developments of Importance, in LEXPERT
ARTICLES ON RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, CANADIAN LEGAL LEXPERT DIRECTORY
2000 (2000) (QL).
202 SOLOMON, supra note 197, 1.
203 THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REVIEW OF CIVIL JURY
AWARDS, L.R.C. 75 (1985).
204 Force v. Gibbons (1978), 93 D.L.R.3d 626, 632 (B.C.S.C.).
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"the view of the judiciary is that judge-made awards are not in-
herently superior to jury awards. '2 °5
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that a trial judge
must reduce a jury's award of non-pecuniary damages to con-
form with the Cap where the award that exceeds it.
20 6
Whether the jury is or is not advised of the upper limit, if the
award exceeds the limit, the trial judge should reduce the award
to conform with the "cap" set out in the trilogy and adjusted for
inflation. While a trial judge does not sit in appeal of a jury
award, the trilogy has imposed as a rule of law a legal limit to
non-pecuniary damages in these cases. It would be wrong for the
trial judge to enter judgment for an amount that as a matter of
law is excessive.
20 7
This statement infers that a trial judge is only justified in ad-
justing a jury award for damages where it is excessive as a matter
of law and that consideration of a jury award beyond that stan-
dard is for the appellate court.
Apart from the issue of exceeding the Cap in respect of non-
pecuniary damage awards, as a general rule, appellate courts will
not set aside a lower court's assessment of damages merely be-
cause the appellate court would have arrived at a different con-
clusion.20 In Nance v. B.C. Electric Railway,2 °9 Viscount Simon
gave the leading judgment on this subject:
Whether the assessment of damages be by a Judge or a jury, the
Appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own
for that awarded below simply because it would have awarded a
different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. Even if the
tribunal of first instance was a Judge sitting alone, then, before
the Appellate Court can properly intervene, it must be satisfied
either that the Judge, in assessing the damages, applied a wrong
principle of law (as by taking into account some irrelevant factor
or leaving out of account some relevant one); or, short of this,
that the amount awarded is either so inordinately low or so inor-
dinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate ...
[W]hen on a proper direction the quantum is ascertained by a jury, the
disparity between the figure at which they have arrived and any figure at
205 Brisson v. Brisson (2002), 213 D.L.R.4th 428, 21-26 (B.C.C.A.).
206 ter Neuzen v. Korn, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 674.
207 Id. 114. For a recent confirmation that a trial judge has a duty to reduce a
jury award for general damages that exceeds the Cap, see Lee v. Dawson (2003),
17 B.C.L.R.4th 80 (S.C.); and Maodus v. Zeidler & Walker Ltd., No. C21926/99
(Ont. S.CJ. May 14, 2003).
208 WADDAMS, supra note 9, at 13-22, 13.420.
209 Nance v. B.C. Electric Ry., [1951] 3 D.L.R. 705, 713-714 (P.C.).
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which they could properly have arrived must, to justify correction by a
Court of Appeal, be even wider than when the figure has been assessed by
a Judge sitting alone. The figure must be wholly "out of proportion.21 0
There are cases that suggest that jury awards should only be
set aside by an appellate court where they are "perverse, uncon-
scionable, shocking to the conscience of the court, indicating
gross error or improper motive, or when such as no reasonable
jury acting judicially could have reacted. '211 Since the Supreme
Court clearly articulated some limits in the Trilogy, appellate
courts interfere with jury awards more readily on the basis that
the jury has made a gross error in arriving at a non-pecuniary
damages award.212 If an appellate court decides that justice re-
quires an interference with ajury award of damages, the proper
remedy is to order a new trial, unless the parties consent to the
appellate court substituting its own assessment,213 or the appel-
late court is permitted to do so by legislation. 214
Bob v. Bellerose215 is a recent example of both trial and appel-
late level treatment of an excessive jury award for non-pecuniary
damages for personal injury. Mr. Bob was the victim of a car-
jacking during which Mr. Bob was dragged by the vehicle over a
city block. Mr. Bob suffered serious physical and psychological
injuries that will plague him for the rest of his life. The jury's
non-pecuniary damages award included $500,000 for "pain, in-
jury, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life," and $75,000 for
aggravated damages. The trial judge, with counsels' agreement,
reduced the $500,000 award to $281,000 to comply with the Cap
imposed by the Trilogy. The trial judge ruled that the $75,000
aggravated damages award was not subsumed within the Cap. 6
The appellate court considered the defendant's appeal on the
ground that the adjusted award was so high as to be wholly erro-
neous. 2 1 7 The majority found that even the adjusted award was
not supportable and stated that while the historical solution has
been to order a new trial, they found themselves to be in the
210 Id. (emphasis added).
211 WADDAMS, supra note 9, at 13-23, 13.440.
212 Id. at 13-25, 13.470.
211 Id. at 13-24, 13.450.
214 See, e.g., the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 119 (R.S.O., ch.
C.43, § 119 (1990) (Ont.)) (discussed in Padfield v. Martin (2003), 64 O.R.3d
577 (C.A.)).
215 Bob v. Bellerose (2002), 98 B.C.L.R.3d 384 (S.C.), varied on appeal (2003),





place of a court of first instance and reduced the award for non-
pecuniary damages to $200,000.218 The majority also upheld the
award of $75,000 for aggravated damages, but since the total
non-pecuniary damages would then be $275,000, they did not
address the issue of whether or not aggravated damages would
be included in the capped amount.219 Justice Newbury, in dis-
sent, agreed with the majority's reduction of the non-pecuniary
damages figure to $200,000, but would have fixed the aggra-
vated damages at $10,000 as the jury's award was, in her view,
unreasonable and inordinately high.22 °
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has considered an appeal on
the ground that ajury award for personal injury damages was so
inordinately high as to be wholly erroneous. 221 The court up-
held the jury's awards under all heads, including general dam-
ages, noting that the general damage award did not exceed the
Cap on general damages. 222 In conclusion, the court made the
following statement about appellate courts' powers to adjustjury
damage awards: "Even if we were in disagreement with the
amounts set by the jury, this court would not be justified in in-
tervening unless the figures were 'wholly out of all proportion
'223
VI. PERIODIC PAYMENT AWARDS AND
STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS
The following definition of a structured settlement, articu-
lated in 1981, is still frequently cited in Canada, and also ex-
plains the primary advantage of such settlements:
Structured settlements are a means whereby all or part of the
damages are paid to a claimant by means of periodic payments
rather than by means of a lump sum. Perhaps the prime advan-
tage of a structured settlement is that payments are received tax
free in the hands of the plaintiff whereas if the plaintiff had used
the lump sum to purchase an annuity the interest portion of the




22, Binder v. Mardo Constr. (1994), 136 N.S.R.2d 20 (C.A.).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Yepremium v. Scarborough General Hospital (No. 2) (1981), 31 O.R.2d
384, 387 (H.CJ.); see also Fuchs v. Brears (1986), 44 Sask. R. 112 (C.A.); Bowser v.
Bowser, [1998] O.J. No. 2085, 12-13 (C.A.) (QL). For a succinct explanation
of the conditions necessary to maintain the tax exempt status of structured settle-
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Structured settlements can be used in Canada only where all
parties expressly and mutually consent to their use,2 25 or where
legislation specifically authorizes courts to use them as a means
of damages assessment. Thus, courts are not at liberty to make
periodic payment damages awards on their own initiative in the
absence of enabling legislation.226
It has long been recognized that the historical common law
rule227 that tort damages are to be awarded on a one-time, lump
sum basis can potentially work injustice for either the plaintiff or
the defendant.228 There have often been calls for relaxation of
the rule to allow trial courts to order payment of the future dam-
ages components of the award on a periodic or structured basis,
or to allow post-award adjustment where unforeseen contingen-
cies develop. 229 However, it is still the law in all Canadian juris-
dictions that in the absence of legislation authorizing the
imposition of structured personal injury damage awards, courts
cannot impose any form of such awards by judicial order.23 °
The parties can negotiate and consent to a structured settle-
ment, but obviously, this is not equivalent to the courts having
the inherent power to impose on the parties a structured dam-
ages award that controls over time the stream of money payable
ment income, see Bob Nigel, So what is a structured settlement and what are its advan-
tages? 22 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY, Dec. 13, 2002, at 3.
225 COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 54.
226 Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750.
227 See, e.g., Fournier v. Canadian Nat'l. Ry. Co., [1927] A.C. 167 (J.C.P.C.).
228 In Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750, Justice McLachlinJ. (now Chief
Justice of Canada) wrote:
The imperfections of a lump sum, once-and-for-all award, as a
means of providing for a plaintiffs cost of future care have often
been noted. Where the injury is serious and the period of time for
which care must be made lengthy, a large number of variables
enter into the calculation. Should the plaintiff live longer than
projected, or earn less on his capital than expected, he will run out
of funds for his care. On the other hand, should chronic illness
force him to live in an institution rather than his own home, or
should he die earlier than forecast, the funds provided may turn
out to be excessive, resulting in a windfall for him or his heirs at the
defendant's expense.
Id. at 756, 7.
For an overview of the various arguments that have been put forward in favour of
allowing periodic payment awards, see COOPER-STEPHENSON, supra note 3, at 50-
54, where references to more focused writing on this issue are also found.
229 CASSELS, supra note 9, at 112-113 (describing some of the post-award events
that can affect its sufficiency or its fairness).
230 OSBORNE, supra note 9, at 105; see alsoJOHN P. WEIR, STRUCTURED SETTLE-
MENTS 5 (1984).
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to the plaintiff, and can impose conditions in respect of future
developments.
In the leading case on this issue, the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada expressed the view that judicial reform through the com-
mon law of the type that would permit courts to impose periodic
payment awards or structured settlements without the express
consent of the parties is beyond the Supreme Court of Canada's
jurisdiction (and hence also beyond the jurisdiction of any
other Canadian court of inherent jurisdiction) and compe-
tence. 231 The court stated that such a change would be major
and far-reaching, would affect diverse economic and policy in-
terests, and would require devising subsidiary rules and proce-
dures relevant to implementing such change.2 32 Consequently,
perspectives other than the judicial should be canvassed. Any
change should result from a broad-based consultative process
involving all stakeholders, and should be implemented at the
legislative level. Furthermore, "and perhaps most importantly,
there is the long-established principle that in a constitutional
democracy, it is the legislature, as the elected branch of govern-
ment, which should assume the major responsibility for law
reform. '233
In Canada, there are still only limited instances of legislation
enabling or requiring courts to make structured or periodic
damages awards. This is somewhat different from the United
States, where even in 1989, there were numerous jurisdictions in
which the courts were legislatively enabled to order periodic
payment schemes as a component of personal injury damage
awards (particularly, it would seem, in medical malpractice
cases) .234 In a Canadian torts text published in 2000, the author
wrote, "[a] few provinces including Ontario, Manitoba and Brit-
ish Columbia have legislation that permits or requires periodic
payments to be ordered in limited circumstances. 23
5
231 Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750, 760-762. The Supreme Court of
Canada overturned the Manitoba Court of Appeal's decision to order monthly
payments of a damages award for future care made in a personal injury action.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 760-761.
234 Id. at 757-758, 9 (citing the American legislation).
235 OSBORNE, supra note 9, at 106. The legislation referenced for each of the
three provinces was the Courts ofJustice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 116 (R.S.O.,
ch. C.43, § 116 (1990) (Ont.)); The Court of Queen's Bench Act, S.M. 1988-89, c.
4, s. 88.1 (S.M., ch. 4, § 88.1 (1988-89) (Man.)); and the Insurance (Motor Vehi-
cle Act), R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, s. 55 (R.S.B.C., ch. 231, § 55 (1996) (B.C.)).
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In Ontario, the court has the discretionary power to order pe-
riodic payments in proceedings where damages are claimed for
personal injuries if all affected 236 parties consent. If the plaintiff
requests that an amount be included in the award to off-set any
liability for income tax from the investment of the award, the
court may order the defendant to pay all or part of the award
periodically if it is satisfied that periodic payments would be in
the plaintiff's best interest. As a practical matter, the court
should first assess damages in the conventional manner, then
put the plaintiff to an election whether to request a gross-up. If
the plaintiff elects a gross-up, the defendant should either agree
to a lump sum award with the gross-up, or submit a proposed
structure. If the defendant proposes a structure, the plaintiff
has the onus of establishing a plan or method better than the
proposed structure.237
In Manitoba, it appears that an order for periodic payments
could be made in all actions for personal injury damages. How-
ever, the language in the Manitoba statute is permissive: the
court may order periodic payments on application of any party.
In British Columbia at present, periodic payment or structured
settlement awards are only authorized in respect of motor vehi-
cle accident damage awards, and only if the award for pecuniary
damages is at least $100,000 and the court considers it to be in
the best interests of the plaintiff.23 Amendments to the British
Columbia Law and Equity Act 239 were enacted several years ago
but remain not in force.24 ° Once in force, Sections 65 through
236 In dealing with the 1984 version of the Courts of Justice Act, the Ontario
Court of Appeal ruled that where parties have settled the quantum of a claim but
require judicial determination of liability issues, the defendant remains an "af-
fected party" such that a structured settlement cannot unilaterally be imposed
upon the defendant on the plaintiffs application. Bowser v. Bowser, [1998] OJ.
No. 2085, 12-13 (C.A.) (QL).
237 In Chesher v. Monaghan (2000), 48 O.R.3d 451 (C.A.), the Ontario Court
of Appeal ruled that the structured settlement advocated by the defendant physi-
cian was not in the best interests of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was found to bear
the onus of demonstrating that periodic payments were not in his best interests.
For another recent Ontario case dealing with structured settlements, see Roberts
v. Morana (2000), 187 D.L.R.4th 577 (Ont. C.A.).
238 Insurance (Motor Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, s. 55 (R.S.B.C., ch.
231, § 55 (1996) (B.C.)). A recent example of a British Columbia case in which
the court ruled that a structured settlement was not in the best interests of a
plaintiff injured in a motor vehicle accident is Lee v. Dawson (2003), 17
B.C.L.R.4th 80 (S.C.).
239 Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253 (R.S.B.C., ch. 253 (1996) (B.C.)).
24o Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 (Supp.), c. 253, s. 3 (R.S.B.C., ch. 253,
§ 3 (Supp. 1996) (B.C.)) (affecting Sections 65-67 of the Law and Equity Act,
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67 of the Law and Equity Act will deal with periodic payment
orders of damages awards in personal injury actions and fatal
accident claims brought under the Family Compensation Act. 241
Subject to certain conditions, they will enable British Columbia
superior courts to order periodic payment of the damages award
components relating to future earning capacity and cost of fu-
ture care.
It has been stated that structured settlements "guard against
the risk of large sums being dissipated by seriously disabled
plaintiffs who may then be forced to fall back on the social wel-
fare system. 2 4 2 This comment raises for consideration the issue
of the interface between a plaintiffs financial position on a go-
ing-forward basis and his or her entitlement to collateral bene-
fits, and particularly government benefits and subsidies. Where
benefits entitlement is subject to means, asset, or income tests,
the effect of an on-going stream of payments from a structured
settlement or periodic payment award must be taken into ac-
count.24' Even if the government agency's position is that the
structured settlement itself (i.e. the capital to fund the annuity)
is not an asset (and even this may not be the case), the monthly
income to be received by the plaintiff may be treated as
unearned income and may lead to a reduction in the amount of
government benefit for which the plaintiff is eligible. Where
counsel are considering use of a structured settlement and it is
anticipated that the plaintiff will also receive and need to rely
upon government benefits, it is prudent to seek a ruling from
the appropriate government agency or department prior to fi-
nalizing the structured settlement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The assessment of damages for personal injury or wrongful
death in Canada is based on rules and principles authoritatively
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253 (R.S.B.C., ch. 253 (1996) (B.C.)), and which, as of Septem-
ber 8, 2003, had still not been brought into force by regulation).
241 Family Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 126 (R.S.B.C., ch. 126 (1996)
(B.C.)).
242 OSBORNE, supra note 9, at 106.
243 This paper merely raises this issue for consideration. For a non-exhaustive
sampling of various issues that arise in this area, see, e.g., Alan Suggerson, Struc-
tured Settlements - Loss of Benefits - Special Needs Trusts, 5 PERSONAL INJURY, Issue 6
(2002) (written from an English perspective, and referencing Beattie v. Sec'y of
State for Soc. Sec., [2001] E.WJ. No. 1658 (Eng. C.A., Civil Div.) (QL)); Bob
Nigel, Interplay between disability support and damage settlements can be confusing, 22
THE LAWYRS WEEKLY, Nov. 17, 2002, at 17.
20041
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settled either by the legislatures or by the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada. Under our present system, assessments are generally pre-
dictable, relatively consistent, and reasonably understandable.
The law in this area will, of course, continue to develop. Thus,
despite the clarity of the basic rules, there is often room for crea-
tive and innovative argument on what will constitute a proper
and fair assessment of damages. Ultimately, to achieve an assess-
ment that fulfills the function of the law of damages, what is
called for is not only an understanding of the rules and princi-
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APPENDIX IV
Subrogation Rights Table - Statutory Conferral of Subrogation Rights on Government
Agencies: The following table lists a representative and fairly comprehensive sampling of
the provincial and territorial legislation conferring rights of subrogation on various gov-
ernment bodies in each Canadian jurisdiction, but excludes legislation that is specific to the
motor vehicle accident context. References to the applicable section numbers for the spe-
cific provisions containing the subrogation right are included.
Jurisdiction Legislation
British Columbia Hospital Insurance Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 204, s. 25.
Workers Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 492, s. 10.
(all B.C. legislation current to Aug 25, 2003)
Alberta Hospitals Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-12, s. 9.
Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-15, s. 22.
(all Alta. legislation current to August 30, 2003)
Saskatchewan The Department of Health Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. D-17, s. 19.
The Workers' Compensation Act, 1979, S.S. 1979, c. W-17.1, s. 40.
(all Sask. legislation current to August 18, 2003)
Manitoba The Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, C.C.S.M. c. H35,
s. 106(1).
The Worker's Compensation Act, R.S.M. 1987, C.C.S.M. c. W200,
s. 9(5).
(all Manitoba legislation current to September 1, 2003)
Ontario Health Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 30.
Long-Term Care Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, c. 26, s. 59.
Ministry of Community and Social Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
M.20, s. 8.
Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 25,
Schedule B, s. 52.
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16,
Schedule A, s. 30.
(all Ontario legislation current to August 30, 2003)
Quebec Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.Q., c. A-3, s. 7.
An Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases,
R.S.Q., c. A-3.001, s. 446.
Hospital Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28, s. 10.
Health Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-29, s. 18.
Public Health Act, R.S.Q., c. S-2.2, s. 75.
An Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services, R.S.Q., c. S-
4.2, s. 78.
An Act Respecting Health Services and Social Services for Cree
Native Persons, R.S.Q., c. S-5, s. 151.
(all Quebec legislation current to July 1, 2003)
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New Brunswick Health Services Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-3, s. 5(3)
Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13, s. 10(10).
(all N.B. legislation current to June 30, 2003, confirmed no
amendments since that date)
Newfoundland Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Act, R.S.N. 1990, c.
W-11, s. 45(8).
Medical Care Insurance Act, S.N. 1999, c. M-5.1, s. 19(4).
(all Nfld. Legislation current to August 8, 2003)
Northwest Territories Hospital Insurance and Health and Social Services Administration
and Nunavut Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. T-3, s. 19.
Medical Care Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-8, s. 20.
Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. W-6, s. 12.
(current to February 1, 2003)
Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, s. 30.
Health Services and Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 197, s. 18.
(all N.S. legislation current to July 10, 2003, confirmed no
amendments since that date)
Prince Edward Workers Compensation Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. Q-, s. 11 (3).
Island (current to July 1, 2002)
Health Services Payment Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-2, s. 22(4).
(current to October 29, 2003)
(confirmed no amendments since those dates)
Yukon Territory Health Care Insurance Plan Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 107, s. 9
Hospital Insurance Services Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 112, s. 10
Travelfor Medical Treatment Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 222, s. 11
Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 231, s. 56.
(Current to June 30, 2003, confirmed no amendments since
that date)
